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ROBIN L. MICHAEL,
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RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

:
:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:
:
:

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Respondent. : Case No. 950146-CA
00O00

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant jurisdiction arises pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (g) ,
Utah Code Annotated (1987, as amended) (hereinafter "U.C.A.").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue presented on appeal is as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court made an error in determining

that Appellant Robin Michael did not show a substantial, material
change of circumstances requiring the Court to reach the issue of
whether a change of custody was in the best interests of the
children herein.

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The following code provisions, statutes and rules are
determinative in this case and complete copies are in the Appendix
to this brief:
1.

U.C.A. §30-3-10, statutory best interest criteria

for custody.
2.

U.C.A. §30-3-10.2 and 10.3, statutory criteria for

modification of custody orders.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of Modification of Decree
and Dismissal of Plaintiff's Petition issued by Judge Timothy R.
Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court.

This Order was

entered December 14, 1994. No post trial motions were filed. This
case originated as a divorce issued by a Colorado Court on July 1,
1991 after a marriage of eight years.

Physical custody of the

parties' two minor children was awarded
Michael.

to Respondent

Rodney

The Decree of Divorce awarded the parties joint legal

custody and required that all significant decisions pertaining to
the children's health, education, religious training and general
welfare be made jointly by the parties.

Appellant Robin Michael

was awarded substantial and liberal visitation rights.
On or about October, 1992, Robin Michael filed a Petition
to Modify concerning custody.

A trial was held in July, 1994 at
2

which time the Court bifurcated the proceedings directing that it
would first hear evidence pertaining to the issue of whether a
substantial, material change of circumstances had occurred prior to
considering whether it was in the best interests of the children to
effect a custody change.

On August 12, 1994, the Court issued a

written Memorandum Decision that the evidence did not rise to the
level necessary to meet the change of circumstances test and that
the Court would not take any additional evidence on whether a
change of custody was in the best interests of the children.
Findings and an Order dismissing Plaintiff's modification petition
were entered by the Court December 14, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Overview.
1.

The parties to this appeal were married September

23, 1983 and were divorced eight years later on July 1, 1991.

On

that date, the District Court for the County Jefferson, State of
Colorado enter an order dissolving the marriage of the parties.
2.

The Colorado Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1) awarded

the parties joint legal custody of their minor children with the
primary physical custody to Mr. Michael.

The parties have two

children namely Schuyler (born December 15, 1985) and Ashleigh
(born July

10, 1987).

(Record, p. 8; paragraph

Decree).
3

12, Colorado

3.

During the pendency of the Colorado divorce action

Mr. Michael was residing in Colorado with the children and Mrs,
Michael

was

commuting

employment reasons.

between

California

and

Colorado

for

She had taken a substantial job promotion and

relocated to California with the expectation that Mr. Michael and
the children would shortly follow.

Instead, Mr. Michael filed for

divorce and was awarded temporary custody.

(Record p. 172-182,

854-856, Amended Petition to Modify).
4.

The Colorado Court determined that it was in the

best interests of the children that their parents be awarded joint
legal custody with primary physical custody to Mr. Michael.

Robin

Michael was awarded substantial and liberal visitation and under
the terms of the joint legal custody plan, the Court ordered all
major

decisions

concerning

the

health,

education,

religious

training and general welfare of the children to be made jointly by
the parties.

The Court found that the custody decision was quite

difficult and that both parties were "excellent parents" stating
was follows:
"13.
The Court finds that this has been a
difficult case.
Both parties are excellent
parents. Both parties have taken substantial
efforts in the past in the best interests of
the children. Both parties have done a good
job in parenting their children. There is no
real difference in the parenting abilities of
the parties. Both parties are well-adjusted
and both parties are in good physical and
mental health.
4

19. The Court has determined that joint legal
custody is most advantageous to the two
children. The Court does have some concerns
because of the physical distance between the
two parties. The Petitioner is in Utah and
the Respondent is in California.
Such a
geographical distance is not conducive to
communication.
20.
The evidence, however, is that the
parties are interested in making that type of
arrangement work. Therefore, the benefit to
the children of joint custody outweighs any
difficulties a parent at this time with regard
to their lack of geographic proximity.
22. The Court develops the following plan for
joint legal custody. The Petitioner is to be
the primary residential custodian. All major
decisions
concerning
health,
education,
religious training, and general welfare are to
made jointly.
The legal residence of the
children shall be with the Petitioner. The
parties are to consult with each other on a
prompt basis as appropriate without hostility
or demeaning each other. . . ." (Record, p. 810; Colorado Decree of Divorce).
5.
be

awarded

The Colorado Court also ordered that Robin Michael
"substantial visitation" with

the children

as the

parties could agree and established a minimum visitation schedule
as follows:

one weekend per month, ten days at Christmas, three

weeks in the summer, and free telephone access to the children.
The Court also ordered that both parties should promptly exchange
information concerning the medical, dental and educational aspects
of the children and that neither party should prohibit access of
the other party to such information.
5

The obligation to exchange

information specifically extended to report cards, notification of
scheduled school events, parent-teacher conferences, and exchange
of all preschool records and reports.
6.

At the time the Colorado Decree was entered, Mr.

Michael had already moved the children from Colorado to the State
of Utah as he had been transferred by his employer.
Mrs.

Michael

was

residing

in

California

transferred there by her employer.

At that time,

having

also

been

(Record, p. 172-182, 1081-

1085).
7.

Once the Colorado Decree was entered Robin Michael

left her job in California and moved to Utah to be closer to the
children.

She

compensation.
8.

took

a

substantial

reduction

in

status

and

(Record, p. 172-182; Amended Petition to Modify).
On

or

about

August

10,

1991,

Robin

Michael

domesticated the Colorado Decree in the State of Utah to obtain
court review of the visitation terms since both parties would be
residing

in

the

same

state.

That

petition

was

resolved

by

stipulation of the parties on or about October 7, 1991. (Record, p.
33-38)

(Appendix

2, Third District Court Minute Entry).

The

visitation agreement was that the statewide standard schedule would
be followed, that if Mr. Michael worked out of town the children
were to be left with Mrs. Michael, that Mrs. Michael would be given
a mid-week overnight visit every Wednesday.
6

(Record, p. 29).

9

On i :>.r about October 8, ] 992, Robi n Michael filed a

Petition to Modify concerning custody.
ii i

December

I 99,'

That Petition was amended

LUibsLan1 ; ••* "

alleging

mat:ei: lal

c i r c u m s t a n c e s had occurred since entry -i the Decree.
172).

The

allegations

f ol ] o w j i lg:

D£

changed

'",,|:

chancier
(Record

circumstances

included

the

remarried

delegated

the

• ..-

a.

Mr.

M i chae]

had

and

p r i m a r y c a r e , custody and control of the mi nor children to his new
wife.

Mr

children

Michael's new wife was pregnant and during that time the
were

often

unsupervised,

required

to prepare

their

own

b r e a k f a s t s and get themselves ready and off to school without adult
supervision.

1 Ir

Michael

traveled

regularly,

at

least

once

per

montl: I ai id thus left the chi 1 dren wi th alternate caretakers and not
Robin M i c h a e l .
The minor child Ashleigh
vlsi tail on

wi

r u Ises

spanked her "really hard".
a

on

her

legs

and

had appeared

indicated

her

during
father

August 27, ] 99] Ashleigh appeared with

large bruise under her e y e .
I I i c h a c 1 I l u i d I v,\ nil i thi I "i M I I I in." p h y s i c a l

c.

necessary

for

the

treatment

of

Schuyler

t-fip.r«mv

Michael.

S c h u y l e r h a s s u f f e r e d from c e r e b r a l p a l s y and :*.-* p a r t i c i p a t e d
physical
Mr.

I hipi.rir.ru

Michael

.« i iru e t h e a c j e

of

five

inonit

,.,

„ti«n:e A p r i l

:-

199.2,

cancelled numerous therapy sessions and delegated

7

the responsibility of that therapy to his new wife Cynthia Michael.
Since entry of the Colorado Decree, Mr. Michael had refused to
allow Robin Michael to actively participate in the physical therapy
and did not provide her with regular information.
d.

On January 22, 1991, Mr. Michael was ordered to

provide therapy for both children on his arrival to Salt Lake City,
Utah. He was further ordered to provide monthly written reports to
the children's mother from the day care provider and the physical
therapist.

Mr. Michael had not complied with these orders.
e.

Since entry of the Colorado order and the move

of both parties to the State of Utah, the provisions of joint
custody became unworkable in the following ways:
i.

Mr. Michael had delegated the substantial

care of the children to his new spouse;
ii.

Mr. Michael had failed to cooperate with

the shared responsibility of academic and medical
matters concerning the children.

Specifically, he

had failed to allow Robin to participate in the
children's
Robin

of

school
the

activities,

children's

failed

teachers,

to

inform

school

and

medical care providers.
iii.

Mr.

Michael

had

unilaterally

made

important decisions about the children's health,
8

safety and welfare and academic development without
permitting input from Robin Michael.
t "lr M i.c: lint • I re fused t:o let Robi n M.i.chae 1

i. v

take the children to school or from participating
i

children's

phys • - i

after

school

Michael

children's
mother.

and

tl lerapy.
Between August i

K

activities

refused

return

October, 1991

• .. discuss

• * . ine of

the

following visitation with their

On one occasion he arrived at the mother's

home late

after the children were asleep

and insisted that '. r - children leave with him.
anotl ler

<:>c

On

M i chae]

mother's home with police arid forcibly removed
children.
f.

.!"! i.Ticf." entry of the C.'uloiiido Decree the children

have expressed a desire t,
Michael has punished

..;.> - ;.th thei r natural mother and Mr
children for these statements and for

maintaining

relationship

span .

,-'L

I ui

with

their

mother.

I.dJkiiiq 1.1> hin mo H U M

This
mi

includes

I lit' telephone,

refusing t.;; allowing Schuyler to telephone his mother, and taking
from the children toys, clothing and gifts given them by

9

their

mother.

Mr. Michael had also told the children they would never

see their father again if Robin Michael was awarded custody.
g.

Since entry of the Colorado Order Mr. Michael

instructed the children to call their natural mother "Robin" and to
refer to their step-mother as "madre" a Spanish term for mother.
h.

On January 26, 1992, Robin Michael attempted to

obtain information about her daughter's school status and was told
that she could not obtain that information because the children's
mother was Cynthia (the step-mother).
10.

On or about November 9, 1992, Mr. Michael notified

Robin Michael that he was leaving Salt Lake City, Utah and moving
to Appleton, Wisconsin by Christmas as a result of an employment
transfer. Mr. Michael's notice to Robin Michael was not consistent
with the Court order that required a minimum of 90 days advance
notice.

(Record, p. 178-179).
11.

moving

from

Since the notification that the children would be
Utah,

the

children

became

extremely

upset,

and

emotional and Ashleigh had begun bed wetting and clinging to their
mother.

(Record, p. 178-179).
12.

At

a

hearing

held

before

Commissioner

Judith

Atherton in December, 1992, Mr. Michael was allowed to move the
children from the State of Utah subject to a liberal visitation
schedule during the pendency of a child custody evaluation.
10

That

schedule

provided

transporting
pending

that

Mr. .Michael

the children

to Utah

I he i»va ilia I. ] on .

would

pay the*

for a once

costs

per month

of

visit

Furt IH.-JI „ I lit" Coi 1:1: t appui iited J>i

Jil 1

Sanders to appoint a custody evaluation which order was entered on
or about April 7, 1! 993,

(Record,

ey M i cha<
the

Minute Entry)
-

>p 1 eton , W i HOOIIS i i"i w i t h

*

January, 1993.
parties

have

remarried

since

entry

of the

Colorado Decree,

Michael married Cynthia Michael on November

30,

. \el marri ed Duane CI i.i:

B.

,

riiia

Evaluation of D r . Jill Sanders.
custody

S a i i ci e r

evaluation

- •• performed

. L o g i s t,

by Dr. Ji ] J

i t ia1

December, 1993 recommended that their

i: e p o i: I: d a t e d

change in the current

order of joint custody, with Rodney Michael as primary physical
::iistodI an

(Appendix

Recommendations).
Sanders
report

Shortly before

reinterviewed

should

the children

•

be awarded

mac | e a

<

aother

dramatic change in nx

he preferred to 1 ive,

•!..-•
v

and preparer

(Appendix 4; Plaintiff's Exhibit
|.jie cj:i£^c| j i a c |

.

* trial

physij. •'•-•'.•

slaf.imi) Ihal

Schuyler,

-.

. H 9 4 . . ;.

supplemental

i- ~
* .-

;u8.b.

Sanders testified that
ixpressions about w h e r e

that he was "adamant" about his dislike of
11

his step-mother Cynthia, and that he had articulated episodes of
mistreatment by his step-mother such as being pushed against a
bureauf dragged downstairs by his arm and her using foul language
towards him.

Also that he exhibited increased tantrum behavior at

his father's home which doesn't occur with Robin.
873).

(Record 868-

Dr. Sanders further testified unequivocally that Schuyler

was certain to experience harm if he were returned to the custody
of his father, outlining numerous harmful potential consequences
including depression, rebellion and running away.
16.

The following is an excerpt from the trial testimony

of Dr. Jill Sanders in this case given July 12, 1994, Page 47
(Record, p. 888-889):
"Well, on the side of not—let's talk about
not letting him live with his mother. I think
there are some substantial problems there. I
"think — I would go to the bookie and bet on
the fact that if he does not — is not allowed
to spend — either live with his mother, or
spend more time with his mother, that his
negative
behavior
in
Wisconsin
will
accelerate. This is textbook stuff. You read
about it in — about children of divorce that
when they are uncomfortable with their
placement, the easiest way for an eight year
old to get things changed is to misbehave so
badly that one of the parents doesn't want
them any more. So this is real common. It's
in my mind very predictable, and in fact
Schuyler told me yesterday what his plans are
if he isn't allowed to live with his mother.
So this kid has already advanced to the point
in his fantasy that he's developed a plan for
what happens if he doesn't live with his mom.
12

So I think we could certainly expect
acceleration of very difficult behavior.

an

The kind of adjacent risk to that for Rod and
Cynthia in particular is that if they have to
become these really disciplinary p a r e n t s , the
good relationship that I think they truly have
with Schuyler is going to be diminished, if
not destroyed, fay having to deal consistently
with a kid who's misbehaving and acting out.
The second primary risk of not letting him
live with his mother is his sense of
powerlessness,
and
helplessness
and
hopelessness and probably some degree of
clinical depression would accelerate. I would
be surprised if I wouldn't see that in
Schuyler. The third risk is that if he goes
back to Wisconsin, and lives in his regular
placement, that the only thing that will
happen to the idealization that's occurred
around his mother is going to get w o r s e . It's
going to get bigger, and she's going to get
bigger and better, and more w o n d e r f u l , and
more perfect I n h i s mi nci the longer he has to
be away from her.
And I think that leads
sometimes to real extreme behavior, such as
running away, or truly violent behavior toward
one of the custodial parents. In terms of the
risks of — "
17

Attacl led heret :::: as Appei id :i x A • 3 „,

:i s ill::,]: le ci is tody

evaluation Conclusions and Recommendations made by Dr. Jil1 Sanders
in her initial report dated December 1993.
18.

Attached hereto as Addendum A-4 is a three page

update to her recommendations prepared by Dr. Jill Sanders
trial dated July

10', 1994,

Thi s summary contains her

recommendations for custody.

13

for

revised

19.

The initial custody recommendation of Dr. Sanders

recommends no change to the physical custody relationship but does
suggest

several

specific

changes

to visitation.

Dr. Sanders

recommends that the children spend nine weeks continuous visitation
with their mother during the summer months, that they spend a seven
day period in the fall and a seven day period in the spring with
their mother, that they alternate the Christmas holiday with their
mother, and that their mother be allowed to visit the children in
Wisconsin upon providing

two weeks notice.

(Appendix

3; Dr.

Sanders Conclusions and Recommendations).
20.

In her revised recommendations prepared at the time

of trial, Dr. Sanders recommends that at least the child Schuyler
be allowed to reside with his mother on a trial basis. At the end
of

that

reviewed.

time, the child's custody
Her

recommendation.

summary

outlines

situation

several

should

reasons

again be

for the new

Among these are the following:
a.

Schuyler's preference has dramatically changed-

-he is adamant about residing with his mother, he has expressed a
strong dislike for his step-mother and has stated episodes of
physical and emotional abuse.
b.

Dr. Sanders believes this change is based on a

true attachment and affinity for his mother as well as a fantasy
that there may be a "better life" with his mother.
14

21.
outlined

by

Dr. Sanders believes that the preference and reasons
the

child

Schuyler

represent

his

"psychological

.<-: ^ are signi£icant r:i sks to 1:1 Ie ch i 1 d by i iot

rea 1 11y *" a i id th«-.

allowing a trial change of physical custody.

Those risks include

the following:
I 11 r; i' • e a s e d a c t x i n j i J m J t 11eh a v i m

a

i 11 hi K t: • 1f h e r ' s

home;
Increased sense of helplessness, hopelessness,
p

- ' • • - -

•

Increased

Idealization

of

relationships

possibly leading t » extreme behavior such, as running away.
C

Findings and Ordei ui
L?

" *

Court.

: was held on * *

custody on _--ly 1* through
Timothy R. Hansor
1'S
that

"

r

-,:M iidecl peti tl on to mod i fy
. *• 4 before the Honorable

istrict Court Judge, presiding.

' . I Cum. t", III furcated the proceedings d i i: ecting

it won] cl first hear evidence pertaining

whether

a

substantial,

occurred prim

hi

material

change

to the issue of

<if circumstances

had

mis i del m g whether, il WM . i n the best intercut is

of the children t^ t-:iec: .a custody change.
A

,dqe issued
:

written Memorandum Decision on

^

»

level necessary for the Court to r each the questic : .L whether a
15

custody change was in the best interests of the children. Attached
hereto as Appendix 5 is the Memorandum Decision.

(Record/ p. 559-

573)
25.

On December 14, 1994, the Court entered Findings and

an Order in this matter. Copies are attached hereto as Appendix 6.
(Record, p. 726-758).
26.

The Findings and Order of the Court contain the

following specifics on the changes of circumstances alleged by
Robin Michael and on which evidence was presented at trial:
a.
Wisconsin.

Intended move of Mr. Michael

This move of Mr. Michael was worked

from Utah to
related and

foreseeable at the time of the parties' divorce. The Court sees no
improper motive on the part of Mr. Michael to relocate to Wisconsin
for his employment and sees no improper motive on the part of Robin
Michael to leave Utah for the state of Missouri since without the
children residing in Utah she has no ties to the State and her
extended family support resides in Missouri.

The evidence shows

that the children have made a reasonable transition to Wisconsin,
and are doing well in school.
b.

Mr. Michael's Remarriage.

This is a positive

rather than a negative factor in the lives of the children.

The

Court interviewed the child Schuyler in chambers and found that his
description of alleged "abuse" by his mother was not typical of a
16

child's language and he may have been influenced to make such
statements. The allegations that the children have been mistreated
by their step-mother are not supported by believable evidence.
c.

Visitation Problems.

There have been ongoing

visitation disputes since the divorce was entered in July of 1991
and this is a continuity of conduct and not a specific change of
circumstances•
d.

Schuyler's Preference. The Court's designated

expert, Jill Sanders, has notably changed her position as regards
custody for Schuyler.

She stated that Schuyler had maintained a

neutral position when initially interviewed and that it changed
shortly before trial where he asserted strongly that he wanted to
live with his mother. Dr. Sanders also reported that Schuyler told
her his step-mother "abused" him.

Dr. Sanders could not account

for this change in position of the minor child other than he
perceived life with his mother would be better and that perception
may be based on fantasy and not reality as he has not recently
lived with his mother on a long term basis. The Court acknowledges
the strong preference of Schuyler is certainly a change but since
it is not based on reality, it cannot be considered a change for
purposes of determining whether or not there has been a significant
change of circumstances.

The Court has no evidence that Schuyler

has been influenced by Robin Michael but finds that some of the
17

child's words and demeanor suggest adult language which may not be
his own.
change

of

Further, that even if the Court believed the stated
preference

by

Schuyler

was

a

material

change

of

circumstances, that change in and of itself is insufficient to
allow the Court to find a material change of circumstances which
would allow it to move forward to the question of best interests.
The appellate courts have found that a child's stated change in
preference alone is insufficient to establish such a change of
circumstances.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred and abused

its discretion in

determining that the evidence presented at trial by Robin Michael
was not sufficient to support a substantial, material change of
circumstances to review the issue of child custody.

In evaluating

the evidence, the Court erred in finding that the child's strong
preference to change households was insufficient to support a
review of the custody issue.

There was more in this case to

support a change of circumstances than simply the unsupported
preference of a minor child.
corroborated

That preference was also analyzed,

and supported by the undisputed testimony of the

custody evaluator Dr. Jill Sanders who testified that the child was
adamant about changing households and the failure to acknowledge
this preference would result in real harm to this child such as
18

depression, rebellion or running away.

The Court thus erred in

ignoring the testimony of Dr. Sanders or in substituting his own
judgment

for

the

clear

unopposed

testimony

of

the

Court's

designated expert.
ARGUMENT
I. CURRENT STANDARDS TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR
CUSTODY MODIFICATION IN UTAH.
A. The Legal Standard—Hogge Test.
It has been established by the Court's of this State that
a party moving for modification of a custody decision must first
establish that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred
subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and then show
that

the

substantial

relationship.

change

is

one

affecting

the

custodial

The leading case is Hogqe v. Hogqe. 649 P.2d 51

(Utah 1982) where the appellate court articulated a two prong test
for considering requests to change custody awards.

First, the

party seeking modification must show that there has been a change
in the circumstances upon which the original custody award was
based which substantially and materially affects the custodial
parent's ability or functioning of the custodial relationship.

If

this test is met, the petitioner must show that a change in custody
is

in

the

best

interests

of

the

child.

This

change

of

circumstances test has been clarified and expanded in subsequent
cases among them, Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984).
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In that case the Court of Appeals explained the nexus between the
changed circumstances and the welfare of the child as follows:
"The asserted change must, therefore, have
some material relationship to and substantial
effect on parenting ability or the functioning
of
the
presently
existing
custodial
relationship. In the absence of an indication
that the change has or will have such effect,
the materiality requirement is not met.
In the case of Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme

Court

created

a

limited

exception

holding

that

the

circumstances of a non-custodial parent may also bear upon the
issue of whether a change of custody is appropriate.
The Court has articulated at least two major policies
which are served by the change of circumstances rule as applied to
custody cases. These are succinctly set forth in the Elmer case as
follows:
"First, the emotional, intellectual, and moral
development of a child depends upon a
reasonable
degree
of
stability
in
its
relationships to important people and to its
environment.
Second, the Courts typically
favor the one time adjudication of a matter to
prevent the undue burdening of the Courts and
the harassing of parties by repetitive
actions." Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 at 602.
The Elmer case also made the important policy statement that the
"res judicata" aspect of the change of circumstances rule must
always be subservient to the best interests of the child, stating
that if the circumstances pertaining to a Decree had subsequently
20

changed, a new determination
development

of all material

should be made based on a full
facts.

Id. at

603.

This is

emphasized by Justice Howe in his concurring opinion in the Kramer
case:
"The best interests of the child should never
be lost sight of, and rules on change in
custody should not be so rigid that this over
arching principle is not followed. Certainly,
it is possible that the principle of
stability, if too rigidly adhered to, can
result in the continuation of custody in a
parent who is indifferent to, or destructive
of, the child's welfare." Elmer v. Elmer. 116
P.2d at 604.
B.

Standard of Appellate Review.
The standard of appellate review for trial court findings

are that they are usually not disturbed on appeal unless they are
found to be "clearly erroneous".

Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836,

838 (Utah App. 1991), Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App.
1991).

A

trial

court's

factual

determinations

are

clearly

erroneous only if they are in conflict with a clear weight of the
evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made."

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d

1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT AT TRIAL TO
ESTABLISH A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
HAD OCCURRED TO THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP.
The evidence presented to the trial Court by Robin
Michael should be found sufficient to establish that a substantial
21

material change in circumstances had occurred to the custodial
relationship justifying review of the custody placement. The Court
erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient. The testimony
of Dr. Jill Sanders, the Court appointed custody evaluator was
emphatic and persuasive that at least the child Schuyler should be
allowed a trial placement in the physical custody of his mother.
There was no contrary expert evidence before the Court recommending
any opposing course of action to that recommended by Dr. Sanders.
The testimony of Dr. Sanders outlined serious and clear
risks to the child if he were not allowed to change households and
reside with his mother.

(Record, p. 859-871).

These risks are

also summarized in the supplemental report submitted at trial by
Dr. Sanders contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit

"1" (Appendix 4 ) .

That summary states that Schuyler was the child most traumatized by
the divorce and that his strong preference to reside with his
mother was his "psychological reality". Based on this reality, the
risk of not letting him reside with this mother would result in the
following:
1.

Increase in acting out behavior in Wisconsin to make

[his father] not want him.
2.

Increased

sense

of

helplessness,

powerlessness, and possibly depression.
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hopelessness,

3.

Increased idealization of relationships, possibly

leading to extreme behavior (i.e. run away).

(Appendix 4)

Dr. Sanders also outlined the risk of letting him live
out his fantasy [residing with this mother] as follows:
1.

Extreme disappointment and anger when fantasy of

exceeding better life does not materialize.
2.

Considerable guilt about leaving father, siblings

(Appendix 4 ) .
After presenting careful testimony about the change in
preference of the child Schuyler and analyzing for the Court the
above-stated risks, Dr. Sanders recommended that Schuyler's time
with his mother be extended for approximately two months, that this
preference be reviewed at that time.

If the preference was still

strong, then Schuyler should be allowed to remain with this mother
from September through December and again be reevaluated at that
time along with a review of status of his younger sister Ashleigh
and what impact there may be on the splitting of the sibling unit.
(Record, p. 891-893)
The

testimony

of

Dr.

Sanders

was

very

strong

and

unequivocal which is the same way she reports the preference as
stated by the child Schuyler.

There was no contradiction to the

testimony of Dr. Sanders at the time of trial and no opposing
expert or factual dispute was made as to the child's preference
23

which was admitted by all parties. The judge interviewed the child
Schuyler in chambers and in his Memorandum Decision filed in this
case agrees that the preference was reiterated.

He also finds that

Schuyler used inappropriate, overly adult language in describing
"abuse" in his home and that overall his statements were "not as
strong" as those related by Dr. Sanders.

For these reasons the

judge apparently discounts the preference of the child Schuyler,
and overrides the testimony of Dr. Sanders. He also finds that the
preference is based on fantasy so it does not support a change of
circumstances. This is contrary to what Dr. Sanders stated that it
is important and part of the child's psychological reality even if
his preference may be based on fantasy.

(Record, p. 887). He also

finds specifically that "a child's stated change in preference,
even when based in reality, is not sufficient in and of itself to
make a change of circumstances to meet the requirements of the
first phase in the petition to modify custody."

(Record, p. 559-

573; Memorandum Decision—Appendix 5 ) .
The Court errs in stating that it is merely a preference
of a child being asserted by Mrs. Michael to support a modification
of custody.

Rather, it is the testimony of the Court designated

expert that is being relied upon which corroborates and evaluates
that preference in a larger context.

The evaluator has thoroughly

interviewed all parties and the child over a significant period of
24

time.

thus, many other elements support her conclusion to modify

custody such as the child's strained relationship with his father
and his dislike of his stepmother which led to tantrums in the
custodial home which did not occur with his mother.

The tantrums

were significant enough that the father sought therapy for the
child with Dr. Seay.
suggestions

of

(Record, p. 860-861; 943). There were also

physical

(Record, p. 868-871).

abuse

toward

Schuyler

in

the

home.

Dr. Sanders then testified to the dramatic

and certain harmful consequences that would occur to the child
Schuyler if he were not allowed to change households.

In light of

this unrefuted, expert testimony it was error for the Court not to
proceed to the issue of whether it was in best interests of the
child to change households.
The facts of this case are very similar to that of
Williams V. Williams, 655 P.2d 652 (Utah 1982) , where the trial
court held a custody decree should be modified.

In that case the

Court found sufficient circumstances to modify custody where four
of the parties children expressed strong preferences to change
households in addition to the custodial parent having another child
out-of-wedlock and the remarriage and greater stability shown by
the non-custodial parent since the divorce.

The Supreme Court

commented on the children's preferences stating:
"such preference are properly considered by
the trial court in determining future custody
25

although
they
are
not
controlling". Jji. at 652.

necessarily

Similarly the case of Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561
(Utah 1983), also presents a case where a modification occurred
based on a combination of children's preference and other factors
showing problems in the custodial placement.

Significant to that

Court was the ongoing conflict between the parents which had
affected the children.

Such tensions were also shown in the case

at bar although minimized by the trial court.

It was error for

Judge Hansen to minimize the acts of Mr. Michael towards Robin
Michael which directly affected the children's relationships.

He

had restricted the communications between the children and Robin
(Record, p. 884-886); interfered with their visits, and did not
provide information to her, interrupted Schuyler's therapy (Record,
p. 1120-1145) moved the children away from their mother, (Record,
725, 939) and would not allow Robin to attend Ashleigh's gymnastics
(Record, p 8 ) .
The current case is also similar to that of Wiese v.
Wiese, 469 P.2d 504 (Utah 1970) an early custody modification case
where a custody change was made.

Although this case does not

arise in the context of the Hogqe-Becker, modification test, it
presents a useful guide to the question of how expert testimony
should impact a custody modification issue.

In that case, two

clinical psychologists testified that the psychological state of
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the children was such that a change of households from the father's
home to the mother, was necessary to serve the best interests of
the children.

Each of the parties in that case had an independent

psychologist evaluate the children and testify at trial.

Both

psychologists were in agreement that the children were emotionally
disturbed showing insecurities, depression and other symptoms after
having residing with and been in the care of their father for a
period of time.

In the present case, Dr. Sanders makes similar

conclusions as regard Schuyler that he will become depressed,
hopeless or worse if not allowed to live with this mother.
In the context of the Hoqge-Becker line of cases the
evidence presented in the current trial by the strong, unrefuted
testimony
preference

by

the

must

expert
be

coupled

considered

with

the

sufficient

substantial, material change of circumstances.

child
to

Schuyler's

establish

a

The Hoqqe case

requires that a change must be shown which "affects the custodial
parent's parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial
relationship . . .,f. The risks outlined by Dr. Sanders if Schuyler
were

forced to remain in his father's care include increased

rebellion, depression or running away.

Moreover, the child's

preference was described as "adamant" and such a strong preference
of a child to live with his other parent can only be the result of
a substantial change in the relationship between the custodial
27

parent and the child.

Indeed, that was dramatically pointed out in

the instant case when the child appeared to be struggling to
maintain a neutral position at the time of the initial evaluation
in December of 1993 and then six months later was expressing a very
strong, preference.
custodial

parent

This is unquestionably

circumstance" and/or

"a change affecting

custodial relationship" as contemplated
Becker and subsequent cases.

a "change in the
the

in the case of Hoqqe,

Moreover, there were additional

factors beyond the preference of the child Schuyler which were
pointed out by Dr. Sanders in her testimony.

She indicated that

the child had a very tense and unhappy relationship with his stepmother and accused her of dragging him down the stairs by his
crippled arm, and pushing him roughly against bureau.

That the

step-mother used foul language and the child had frequent tantrums
in the father's home which led him to be enrolled in therapy.

She

also notes historical charges of physical abuse by Mr. Michael
during the marriage toward his step-daughter. (Record, P. 857-859,
861, 868-873).
Language in the Elmer case also supports a finding that
the evidence presented

by Mrs. Michael

supports a finding of

changed circumstances. In Elmer, the Court clearly articulated the
policies behind the change of circumstance rule. Among these is to
"further the emotional, intellectual and moral development of the
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child". Unquestionably, the expert testimony in this case outlined
potent and real risks to the child's emotional and mental health if
he were forced to remain in his father's home.
Moreover, the Elmer court took pains to discuss the type
of stability intended by the rules outlined in that decision.
Rather than emphasizing stability of the "legal custody arrangement
as such" the Court again emphasized that it viewed stability as the
means

to

promote

"psychological

and

emotional

security

that

underlies a child's well developed sense of self-worth and selfconfidence.
important

Elmer at 604.
to

concurring

acknowledge

opinions

In reviewing the policy issues, it is
the

wide

acceptance

in the Kramer case

by

given

Justices

to

two

Howe and

Stewart, See, Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989),
and Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836

(Utah 1991), among others.

These concurring opinions cautioned against a rigid application of
the Court's
Stewart

"change of circumstances" requirement

proposed

that

the

"preservation

of

and Justice

stability

in

a

destructive parent-child relationship would ultimately be more
detrimental to the interests of the child".
628 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).

Kramer, 738 P.2d at
Justice Howe also

suggested certain situations where rigid application of the Hogqe
rule would work against the best interests of the child, as where
custody is originally grounded on the temporary incapacity of one
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parent, where both parents were marginal, or where custody is
obtained by default. Kramer, 738 P.2d at 629 (Howe, J., concurring
in the result).
Thus, it is imperative that the trial courts not impose
an overly rigid approach to questions of custody modification.
Rather, it is vital that "the res judicata aspect of the changed
circumstances rule must always be subservient to the best interests
of the child".

Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603.

The evidence presented by Robin Michael at trial clearly
meets the requirement that there are changes and problems to be
addressed in the custodial parent's household. Arguably, there can
be no better evidence of problems and concerns in a custodial
parent's household than a child who is reporting episodes of abuse
and articulating a strong preference to leave that household which
is undisputed.

It is also important to realize that it is more

than a child's preference being discussed in the instant case
rather it is the "psychological reality" of the child which the
expert witness has outlined in terms of serious, harmful future
consequences to the child if unheeded.

To require this child to

remain in his father's household in the face of such clear evidence
that there are serious problems in the custodial relationship with
that child, must be considered a dangerous and in this case,
unnecessary risk.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court herein committed error in dismissing
Plaintiff's Petition for Modification for failure to establish a
substantial material change of circumstances concerning custody.
The Court ignored the weight of the evidence, significantly the
strong preference of the child Schuyler and unopposed testimony of
the designated

expert Dr. Jill Sanders who outlined serious,

unequivocal risks of serious harm to the child if a change of
household did not occur.

The overriding consideration in child

custody determinations is the child's best interests

Paryzek v.

Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989) and that has been reiterated
in the custody modification cases notably

Hogge, Becker.

and

Kramer. Given the high certainty of harm anticipated by the expert
to at least one child in this case, it was inappropriate for the
Court to ignore the expert recommendation to change custody on a
trial basis.
DATED this

day of July, 1995.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Statutes

30-3-9

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Utah. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224,342 P.2d
94 (1959).
Where a wife obtained an interlocutory divorce decree in California and, subsequent to
the expiration of one year therefrom, married a
second husband and later applied for and received a nunc pro tunc final divorce judgment

dated pnor to the second marriage, the second
marnage was valid. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah
2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959).
Cited m Van Der Stappen v. Van Der
Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 432.

C.J.S. — 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 764.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 320.

30-3-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 30-3-9 (R.S. 1898 & C.L.
1907, § 1213; C.L. 1917, § 3005; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 40-3-9), relating to the forfeiture of

marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce
proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72,
§ 26.

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or
divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's
desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take
that evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to
the other parent.
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1212x; CX. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch.
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection
(3).

Cross-References. — Disposition of property and children, § 30-3-5.
Removal of children from homestead, § 30-210.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
.
,
A c t i o n of section.
Award proper.
Change of custody.
—Burden of proof.

Children's choice.
Custody evaluation reports.
Factors in
determining best interests of child.
—Improper factors.
—Moral character.
—Sexual abuse.
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30-3-10.2

HUSBAND AND WIFE

interest of the child often requires that a primary physical residence for
the child be designated; and
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the
primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — Family Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 363.

30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors for court
determination — Public assistance.
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal
custody is in the best interest of the child and:
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody.
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by
ordering joint custody, the court shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child will benefit from joint legal custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the
child and reach shared decisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a
positive relationship between the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the
divorce;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents;
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity
to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal custody;
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to
protect the child from conflict that may arise between the parents; and
(h) any other factors the court finds relevant.
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint custody may
preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid to families with
dependent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of
children of the parties at any time subsequent to an order ofjoint legal custody,
the order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4.
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle
future disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or
modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody
through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to
protect the child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 106, § 3; 1990, ch. 112, § 1.

486

DIVORCE

30-3-10.3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
The 1990 amendment of this section did not
make a mere procedural change or simply clarify how the 1988 statute should have been
understood originally. The amendment was

substantial and substantive; thus, retroactive
application is not appropriate. Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 826 R2d 651 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Parental rights of man who is not
biological or adoptive father of child but was
husband or cohabitant of mother when child

was conceived or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655.
Child custody and visitation rights of person
infected with AIDS, 86 A.L.R.4th 211.

30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order.
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal
custody is entered both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing
parents, as provided in Section 30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court.
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court determines
appropriate, which may include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further
order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal right to
determine the residence of the child;
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health,
education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before
making decisions concerning any of these areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present
and future physical care, support, and education;
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school
and other activities, his daily routine, and his association with friends;
and
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and
powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly.
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms agreed to
between the parties.
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be
exercised by the parent having physical custody of the child the majority of the
time.
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit
the authority of the court to order support of the child, including payments
by one custodian to the other.
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying
a support order.
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the
parties agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the
terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody through litigation,
except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the
child.
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In re the Marriage of:
RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

»s.

Petitioner,

and
ROBIN L. MICHAEL,

Respondent.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on April 24 and April 25,
1991 for a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and Permanent
Orders. The Petitioner was represented by his attorney of record,
Carolyn L. Sampson. The Respondent was represented by her
attorney of record, Owen L. Oliver. The Court has reviewed the
evidence, the two custody evaluations, and has heard the
statements' of counsel.
THE COURT hereby makes the following findings of fact and
enters the following orders:,
1.
The parties were married on September 25, 1983 in
Liberty, Missouri. The Court has jurisdiction over both parties
and the subject matter of this action.
2.
At least one party has been a resident and
domiciliary of Colorado for at least ninety days prior to the
commencement of this action.
3.
Ninety days have elapsed since the Court obtained
jurisdiction over the Respondeat.
4.
The Respondent submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of this Court by filing a response to the Petition for Dissolution
of Marriage.
5.

The marriage is irretrievably broken.

6.
The marriage is hereby dissolved and a Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage enters.
7.
The parties have entered into a stipulation providing
for the division of property and debt, and the responsibility for
1-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
MICHAEL, ROBIN L
PLAINTIFF
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the payment of attorney's fees and costs. The Court determines
that said stipulation is fair, equitable, and not unconscionable.
The Court has considered the stipulation in light of the factors
set forth in C.R.S. 14-10-113. The Court hereby approves the
stipulation and makes it an Order of this Court.
8.
Neither party has requested maintenance and therefore
both parties have implicitly waived it. The Court finds from the
evidence that neither party is eligible for maintenance. The
evidence clearly establishes that each is capable of supporting
him or herself.
9.
The primary issue before the Court is the custody of
the two minor children of the marriage. Two children were born as
issue of this marriage: Schuyler Michael, born December 17, 1985,
and currently 5 years old and Ashleigh Michael, born July 10,
1987, and currently 3 years old. No other children are expected.
10.
The Court finds that these two children are minors
and unemancipated. The Court finds that it is appropriate for
this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of custody
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
11.
The Court finds that C.R.S. 14-10-124 and 14-10-123.5
are both applicable. The Court is to determine custody in the
best interests of the children.
12.
The Court finds that the best interests of the
children is served by the parties having joint legal custody of
both children, with the primary physical custody of both children
with the Petitioner.
13.
The Court finds that this has been a difficult case.
Both parties are excellent parents. Both parties have taken
substantial efforts in the past in the best interests of the
children. Both parties have done a good job in parenting their
children. There is no real difference in the parenting abilities
of the parties. Both parties cure well adjusted and both parties
are in good physical and mental health.
14.
The Court also finds that both parties have used poor
judgment in the past which has had an adverse impact on the
children. The Petitioner on one occasion over-reacted with
respect to the discipline of another child of the Respondent to
the point that the discipline was abusive. The Respondent's
decision to take the children and hide for a period of time was
not appropriate.
15.
The Court also finds that on occasion both parties
have made career decisions that indicated a priority for their

-2-

career over their children. Those decisions, however, do not
reflect on either party's parenting ability.
16.
The Court therefore has determined custody primarily
on two factors.
"
"
^
17.
The first of these factors is that these children are
relatively young and thnt thny-had a miTnhftr nf unsettling events
in their life." These include the fact that they were separated
from their mother at an early agef that the Respondent took the
children from Missouri, and the Petitioner's recent move with the
children to Salt Lake City. The Court determines m a t it would be
inappropriate to modify the children's present situation in that
it would simply be one more unsettling event to which they would
need to adjust.
18.
The second of these factors is that the children
appear^tojpe doing well in the current situation. They are
generally happy anci well_ adjusted under the physicial custody of
the Petitioner. If the Court continues the physical custody with
Petitioner, there is assurance that the children will continue to
do well. If the Court were to change physical custody, there
would be uncertainty as to how the children would do.
19.
The Court has determined that joint legal custody is
most advantageous to the two children. The Court does have some
concerns because of the physical distance between the twca
parties. The Petitioner is in Utah and the Respondent is^ln
California. Such a geographical distance is not conducive to
communication.
20.
The evidence, however, is that the parties arq^
^n-hAT^cs'hPfi -in making that type of arrangement work. Thereforej
the fienefit to the children of joint custody outweighs any
difficulties apparent at this time with regard to their lack of
geographic proximity.
21.
The Court is also concerned about the substantial
amount of distrust between the parties. Such distrust is not
conducive to good communications between the parties. The Court
hopes that the entry of final orders will assist the parties with
regard to this issue.
22.
The Court develops the following plan for joint legal
custody. The Petitioner is to be the primary residential
custodian. All major decisions concerning health, education,
religious training, and general welfare are to be made jointly.
The legal residence of the children shall be with the Petitioner.
The parties are to consult with each other on a prompt basis as
appropriate without hostility or demeaning each other. In the

\//WAn-f(c«4A.
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case of a medical emergency, that parent having physical care of
the children at the time shall make the necessary decisions.
23.
The Court orders that the Respondent shall have
substantial visitation with her children as the parties can
agree. The Court feels that it is appropriate for the Respondent
to have visitation with the minor children.
24.
visitation:

The Court establishes the following minimum
A.

One weekend per month;

B.

Ten days at Christmas;

C.

Three weeks in the summer; and

D.

Free telephone access to the children.

25.
The Court orders that both parties shall promptly
exchange information concerning the medical, dental, and
educational aspects of both children. Neither party is to
prohibit apcess of the other party to that type of information.
The obligation to properly exchange information extends to report
cards, notification of scheduled events at school, notification of
scheduled parent/teacher conferences, and exchange of all
preschool records and report^.
26.

The Court finds that C.R.S. 14-10-115 is applicable.

27.
The Court determines that the income of the
Petitioner is $5,334 per month. This is computed on the basis of
a $1,654 base salary every two weeks for a base salary of $3,584
per month. To this is added an average commission of $1,750 per
month, based on $5 per $1,000 of sales for total sales of $150,000
and $2 per $1,000 of sales for total sales of $500,000.
28.
The Court finds that the income of the Respondent is
$4,875. The Court determines that the Respondent has a salary of
$4,385 and that she has an average bonus on a monthly basis of
$490.
29.
The Petitioner can deduct the $31 that he pays each
month for medical insurance which includes coverage for the
children.
30.
The Respondent can deduct the support obligation
which she has for a child by a prior marriage in the amount of
$610 per month.
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31.
This gives the Petitioner an adjusted gross income of
$5,303 and the Respondent an adjusted gross income of $4,275 for a
combined monthly adjusted gross income of $9,578,
32.
The Petitioner's share of the combined monthly
adjusted gross income is 55% and the Respondent's share of the
monthly adjusted gross income is 45%.
33.
The basic child support obligation is $1,484. The
Court determines that the work related child care costs after the
federal tax credit are $278 per month for a total child support
obligation of $1,762 per month.
34.
The Respondent's share of that total child support
obligation is $792.
35.
Therefore, it will be the Order of this Court that
the Respondent shall pay child support in the amount of $792 per
monnth commencing on May 1, 1991. Said child support is due on
the first day of each month thereafter and shall be paid directly
to the Petitioner.
36.. The Petitioner is to maintain health insurance for
the benefit of the minor children.
37. The Petitioner's counsel is to file the Stipulation of
the parties, a written form of these Permanent Orders, and the
appropriate Worksheet A on or before May 24, 1991.
SO ORDERED this

1991.

^Mfji&r&c*
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CUSTODY EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION:
MICHAEL V. MICHAEL
Utah No. 915900171CV
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
ATTORNEYS: Suzanne Marelius and John Mason
DATES OF EVALUATION: 4-16-93, 6-7-93, 8-9-93, 8-10-93, 10-22-93,
1-26-93.
Collateral Interviews:
11-23-93; additional phone
conversations/interviews with Robin, Rodney and Cynthia, not
individually listed; review of documents (see attached list) .

EVALUATOR:
Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist
CASE SUMMAWY
Rodney Michael was awarded temporary custody of Ashleigh and Schuyler
Michael in December, 1989, in Colorado.
Following two custody
evaluations, Rodney and Robin were awarded joint legal custody and
Rodney was awarded physical custody of both children in 1992. Robin
Michael is seeking a change in the physical custody arrangement. Both
parties have remarried.
Robin and Duane Clink and Haley Coleman
(Robin's daughter from her first marriage) live in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Rodney, Cynthia, Ashleigh, Schuyler, and Jake Michael (Rodney
and Cynthia's biological child) live in Appleton, Wisconsin.
FACTORS CONSIDERED:
Preference of Child
Over the course of the last two evaluations, these children have made
various statements regarding preference.
Dr. Hansen, in her
evaluation dated 4-4-91, reported that Schuyler; "Stated that he
always wanted to live with his dad and Ashleigh said she wanted to
live with her mother." During my interviews with the children, they
were able to articulate factors which they liked about each adult
party, including stepparents, and had very little negative information
to report about anyone. Schuyler indicated to me that he felt best
when staying with his grandparents in Missouri, while Ashleigh
indicated that she felt best in Missouri and Wisconsin (biological
father's home) . Both children also indicated that they would like to
spend more time with their mother, though neither child verbalized a
desire to switch primary residence. It is my opinion that Schuyler
is working very hard to maintain neutrality. This is occurring at
considerable cost to him in terms of anxiety, hypervigilance, and fear
that he will alienate one or both parents. Ashleigh, probably because
of her younger age at the time of the divorce, appears to have
adjusted well to having two homes. Both children prefer Missouri,
Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D.
Cluneal Ps\chologist
H i/.i 20(H) • 7 M s South '201)0 I ast Suite 1(H • Salt I a U ( it\

I i «h S41LM • Phone
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simply because they perceive it to be neutral territory.
In my
opinion, preference of the children is not a controversial or
significant issue in this case/
Maintenance of Sibling Unit
Ashleigh and Schuyler should continue to reside together. They have
a significant relationship with each other and probably rely on each
other for stability. Ashleigh and Schuyler have a half-sister, Haley,
who lives with their mother, and a half-brother, Jake, who lives with
their father. I found no evidence to suggest that either of these
half-sibling relationships was emotionally more important to Schuyler
and Ashleigh than the other.
Parent-Child Bond
These children appear to be appropriately and equivalently bonded to
both parents. Neither parent appears to have attempted to emotionally
coerce the children.
Additionally, Schuyler and Ashleigh have
significant relationships with both stepparents.
Maintenance of Previously Determined Custody Arrangement
This is a, sTgnificant ^tacfeea?-:- Rodney Michael has been the primary
custodial parent, ot" Ashleigh and Schuyler for the past four years.
There is no evidence to suggest that these children have been
neglected or abused in Rodney's care. There is considerable evidence
to suggest that Ashleigh and Schuyler are happy and well-adjusted in
this placement, and that they are receiving appropriate educational,
medical, and social support.
Capacity to Parent
Both Robin Clink and Rodney Michael are persons of high moral
character, as are their respective spouses.
Neither party is
emotionally unstable.
Neither party has a history of functional
impairment due to substance abuse. Both parties have the capacity to
financially support these children. Religious incompatibility was not
raised by either party as a significant issue.
In regard to demonstrated depth and desire for custody, Robin Clink
has the weaker history. She voluntarily left Haley in the care of
Rodney Michael when she went to Missouri to recover from Ashleigh's
birth. During this absence, Rodney used excessive physical force in
disciplining Haley.
When Robin moved to California in 1989, she
voluntarily left Ashleigh, Schuyler, and Haley, in Rodney's care.
After nine months of Haley living with Rodney, Robin allowed Haley to
live with Haley's maternal grandparents for the next 1-1/2 years.
Ashleigh was eighteen months old when Robin left for California. This
long-distance parent-child relationship continued for the next two
years, until Robin moved back to Utah in 1991. In my opinion, these
instances constitute significant lapses in desire on Robin's part to
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provide daily care. This opinion is tempered only in part by the fact
that Robin did provide the bulk of primary care for all three children
prior to moving to California.
The fact that Rodney Michael physically abused Haley, Robin's daughter
from her first marriage, on at least one occasion, was not minimized.
Rodney's behavior was inexcusable. Haley's current statements about
repeated abuse from Rodney have limited credibility. Haley personally
reports that she remembers very little about that time in her life,
and believes memories of more extensive abuse have been spurred by
discussions with her grandmother and mother. There is no question
that Rodney used inappropriate force with Haley on one occasion, but
further abuse does not appear substantiated.
Both Robin Clink and
Rodney Michael have used spanking as a form of punishment for their
children.
And
though
this evaluator believes
spanking
is
inappropriate and ineffective, there is no evidence to suggest that
either Robin or Rodney have used excessive force in recent years.
Willingness to Foster A Relationship with the Other Parent
Though Robin perceives that Rodney has interfered with her visitation,
it is my opinion that instances where visitation did not occur, were
not malicious attempts on Rodney's part to deprive Robin of
Visitation.
Documents suggest that Rodney offered Robin more
visitation than required when she returned to Utah and before Rodney
moved to Wisconsin. The current visitation schedule is logistically
difficult, and I found that Rodney has, for the most part, complied
to the best of his ability.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1)

It is recommended that Rodney Michael and Robin Clink continue
to exercise joint legal custody.
This aspect of the custody
arrangement has created little conflict.

2)

It is recommended that Rodney Michael continue as primary
physical custodian.
These are both good parents, with
demonstrated parenting skills, and good intentions.
The
recommendation to maintain primary residence with Rodney is on
the basis of continuing an in-place arrangement which is
functioning well.

3)

The current visitation schedule is unworkable.
From the
perspective of the child, it requires a great deal of travel,
much of it unaccompanied, in return for a very short visit. It
is highly disruptive of their school schedule.
It is also
financially burdensome.
These children are of the age that
longer visitation periods with their mother, as opposed to more
frequent visits, are preferable. Consequently, I propose the
following changes in visitation:
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a)

Ashleigh and Schuyler spend nine continuous weeks
their mother during the summer months.

with

b)

Ashleigh and Schuyler spend one 7-day period in the early
fall and one 7-day period in the early spring with their
mother. Travel to their mother would occur on Saturday,
travel to Wisconsin would occur on the following Sunday.

c)

Ashleigh
and
Schuyler
spend
one
7-day
period
at
Thanksgiving with their mother one year, and the entire
Christmas holiday with their mother the next year.

d)

Robin could also exercise visitation in Wisconsin, with a
2-week notice given to Rodney.

4)

As per Utah guidelines for non-custodial parents, Robin should
have direct access to all personnel involved with her^children's
academic, medical, and extracurricular activities. Robin should
take responsibility for regularly contacting such persons in
order to maintain an understanding of her children's activities.
Robin should be notified immediately in the case of any medical
emergency. She is allowed to attend any/all of the children's
school conferences, school activities, and extracurricular
activities.
She should have free telephone access to the
children.

5)

Cynthia Michael has enthusiastically assumed the stepparent role
with Ashleigh and Schuyler. She exhibits very good parenting
skills and is well suited to parenthood by desire and
disposition. At times, however, her well-intentioned gestures
invade the parental relationship between these children and their
mother. - I would caution Rodney and Cynthia to keep gifts and
emotional letters to a minimum while the children are with their
mother. Though the intent of these communications is to maintain
contact and express love, they in fact make it more difficult for
Ashleigh and Schuyler to focus on their relationship with their
mother.
Robin, of course, perceives such communiques to be
malicious interference. I simply perceive them to be distracting
and perhaps distressing at times for these children.

D. Sanders, Ph.D.
ical Psychologist
JDS/js
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Trial Prep
Michael v. Michael
Trial Date: July 10,1994
1. Parenting style/strengths:
Rod: good structuring, organizational, and rational skills
Robin: spontaneous, fun, active
-neither style inherently bad
-styles dramatically different ~ offers child "illusion" of change when
shifting residences
2. Each made one significant error in parenting judgment:
Rod: excessive use of force with Haley
Robin:; abandonments primary care of children for extended period
(career drive explains her decision only to certain point, perhaps
six months, after that she had evidence family was not timing to
California and marriage might not Work, she cnose to remain in
California and removed children abruptly and without
psychological preparation to California)
3. Schuyler:
-1st two interviews positive about everyone
-intent on remaining neutral
-tantrums have long history™, related to some degree to CP; not simply
related to custody issue
4. Ashleigh:
-able to provide positives and negatives about all adults (logical, realistic
perspective)
-independent
-not as emotionally traumatized by divorce as brother
5. Original recommendation based on these conclusions:
-Rod more consistent in desire for primary care
-children adjusting and doing well in his care
-no reason to disrupt previously determined, long standing custodial
arrangement

6. What has changed since original recommendation?
-only Schuyler's preference
-now he is adamant about living with Robin
-now he strongly dislikes Cynthia
-now he feels "abused"
7. Is this preference reality or fantasy based?
-Fantasy
-support for it being fantasy based is:
-relationships have become exceedingly ideaUzed and demonized
(nothing negative about mother, nothing positive about
Cynthia); no longer has realistic perspective on parties
-preference not based on experience
-believes he can avoid contact with father altogether
(wants to avoid contact because he feels guilty, and is
afraid to hurt father's feelings, concerned about father's
reaction)
-has not considered the realities of life with mother
(i.e., daycare)
8. What factors influenced his preference change? Probably combination of
at least the following factors:
-true attachment/affinity for mother
-fantasy of "better life" with mother
_ -continuing discussions with mother about change of custody
-attraction of moving to Missouri
-normal seeking of better child position in the family
(i.e.. only child, youngest child, etc.)
9. What are the psychological bases for his change of preference?
-Needs to answer 2 questions:
1. Will Mom take me and keep me ?
2. Will Dad let me go in love?
-Living out "abandonment script"

10. Though I am unsure about which of the above factors actually provoked
the current statement of preference, I am absolutely convinced that
Schuyler is devoted to and fixated on the idea of living with his mother.
Given that "psychological reality" for him, what are the risks involved?
-Risk of not letting him live out fantasy =
1. Increase in acting out behavior in Wisconsin to make
Rod not want him
2. Increased sense of helplessness, hopelessness,
powerlessness, and possibly depression
3. Increased idealization of relationships, possibly leading
to extreme behavior (i.e. runaway)
-Risk of letting him live out fantasy =
1. Extreme disappointment and anger when fantasy of
exceeding tetter life does not materalize
2. Considerable guilt about leaving father, siblings

11. If the court, after hearing the evidence presented, decides to honor
Schuyler's preference, I recommend the following:
1. Extend Schuyler's summer visitation. Re-evaluate his adjustment
and preference on or before August 20th.
2. If at that time his preference to live with mother remains, extend
visitation through December, 1994, and re-evaluate at that time.
3. If Schuyler stays with mother through December, she must have
him in bi-monthly therapy to help monitor his adjustment.
4. Ashleigh returns to Wisconsin as scheduled. If custody of Schuyler is
changed at some future date, then the pros and cons of splitting
this sibling unit will need to be addressed.
5. I am strongly opposed to a permanent change of custody for either
child at this point in time.
This recommendation allows:
-Schuyler to experiment with living with mother without
permanent legal consequences
-Allows these siblings to experience living apart
-May pave the way for a more fluid custodial relationship between
the parents
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CASE NO. 9 1 5 9 0 0 $ f t ^ j DISTRICT CSiSBT
Third Judicial District

vs.

AUG 1 2 1994

RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

*m

Defendant.

ALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Cferk

This matter was before the Court for trial on the plaintiff's
Amended Petition to Modify Custody, said hearing taking place on
the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July, 1994. The plaintiff's
Petition to Modify primarily centers around a request that the
custody of the two minor children be changed from the defendant to
the plaintiff, and related issues*

On the aforementioned dates,

the Court took evidence on the initial evidentiary phase of the
change of custody issue, to wit:
material

and

significant

whether or not there has been a

change of circumstances.

The Court

limited evidence to that initial inquiry as is required in a change
of custody proceeding.

At the conclusion of * the evidence offered

in connection with the plaintiff's assertion that there had been a
change of circumstances, the Court took defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Petition under advisement so as to evaluate the weight
of the evidence relating to the issue on change of circumstances
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since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in Colorado on
July 1, 1991.

In that Colorado Decree, the defendant was awarded

physical custody of the two minor children in question, with
certain visitation rights in the plaintiff, and providing that the
parties had joint legal custody so that each party would have
access

to

important

education, medical

information

relating

to

the

children's

records and providers, as well as other

information of interest to parents.
As further hearing dates were scheduled at the time this
matter was taken under advisement on July 18, 1994, and in that
travel arrangements needed to be made in advance of the evidentiary
hearing on the second phase of the change of custody Petition, the
Court orally advised counsel on July 21st, that the Court was
satisfied that the evidence received duffing the course of the
initial phase of the proceedings did not rise to the level
necessary and requisite to show a change of circumstances so as to
allow this matter to proceed to a consideration by this Court of
the children's best interests. Counsel were further advised by the
Court on July 21, that the hearings relating to the second phase
scheduled (consideration of the best interests of the children)
were cancelled, and that a written opinion setting forth the
Court's analysis of the evidence relating to change of custody
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would follow. This Memorandum Decision sets forth in summary form
the Court's analysis of the evidence that leads the Court to the
conclusion that there was no requisite change of circumstances, and
that therefore the plaintiff's Petition for Change of Custody must
be dismissed.
As indicated above, the parties were divorced by a Colorado
court on July 1, 1991.

Custody of the children was determined

following a two day contested hearing.

Defendant was awarded

physical custody of the children, with visitation in the plaintiff.
As this proceeding follows a custody determination made after a
contested divorce trial, this Court must look critically at the
alleged change of circumstances, as opposed to a more relaxed
standard that might be applicable to a situation where custody is
awarded based upon default or stipulation. A contested and trial
determination relating to custody is entitled to, under Utah law,
greater deference than a custody determination made upon default or
stipulation.
Interestingly, at the time of the Colorado trial, both the
plaintiff and the defendant were residing outside that state.
Defendant resided in the state of Utah with the children, and the
plaintiff resided in California.

Each were outside the state of

Colorado because of employment requirements.

Following the
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Colorado divorce Decree, the plaintiff moved from the state of
California to the state of Utah, where both parties resided until
the

defendant's

employment

Wisconsin at the end of 1992.

was

transferred

to

the

state

of

Plaintiff has advised the Court in

her testimony that she will relocate to the state of Missouri,
regardless of the Court's decision on this Petition, and is in the
process of selling her Utah residence in anticipation of that move.
This matter was originally filed as a Petition to Modify a
foreign Decree of Divorce on August 20, 1991, less than two months
after the Colorado Decree. A change in the visitation schedule was
originally

sought,

because

the

plaintiff

had

relocated

from

California to Utah, and that matter was resolved by stipulation
approximately one year later.

In November of 1992, the plaintiff

filed a second Verified Petition to Modify £he Colorado Decree of
Divorce in this action, seeking a change of custody, alleging the
change of circumstance to be the remarriage of the defendant.
On December 31, 1992, the plaintiff filed a further Amended
Verified Petition seeking to modify physical custody that had been
lodged

with

the

defendant

on

multiple

bases,

including

the

remarriage of the defendant, the relocation of the defendant from
Utah

to

Wisconsin,

and

generally

speaking,

a

deteriorating

relationship between the children and the defendant and their
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The parties have then for all intents and purposes

been involved in ongoing litigation regarding the Colorado custody
order since it was entered.
Since the divorce, both the plaintiff and the defendant have
remarried.

In summary fashion, the plaintiff claims that there has

been a significant change of circumstances in that:
1.

The defendant has remarried, and that the children and

particularly the older child, Schuyler, does not get along with his
stepmother, Cynthia Michael.
2.

That defendant's move to Wisconsin as a result of his job

transfer constitutes a change of circumstances.
3.

That defendant's direct involvement with the children has

been reduced, because he now has help with rearing the children
from his current spouse, Cynthia Michael, and that that constitutes
a change of circumstances.
4.

That the children, again, at least the older child,

Schuyler,

has

expressed

plaintiff

and manifested

a

strong

desire

an unwillingness

to

reside with

the

to reside with the

defendant.
5.

Finally, plaintiff has asserted that the plaintiff's

refusal to facilitate visitation since the defendant's move to the
state of Wisconsin constitutes a change of circumstances.
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There is nothing new since the Colorado Decree on the basis
that the parties live in different states.

Except for a short

period of time in Utah; both the plaintiff1 and the defendant have
moved and lived elsewhere.

Immediately prior to the commencement

of the Colorado divorce action, the defendant resided in Colorado
and the plaintiff in California.

At the time of the,divorce trial

in Colorado, the plaintiff resided in California, and the defendant
resided in the state of Utah.

The plaintiff later moved to the

state of Utah and following that, in the early part of 1993, the
defendant relocated to the state of Wisconsin.
All of the moves by both parties since the divorce, with the
exception of plaintiff's move to the state of Utah were workrelated.

At the time of the divorce, the Judge was certainly aware

that the parties lived in states other than the state of Colorado,
and accordingly would have been aware that at that time both
parties had relocated outside the state of Colorado for workrelated reasons. There is nothing new in defendant's work-related
location change from Utah to Wisconsin. The plaintiff's claim thatthe defendant's move was to distance the children from her is not
supported by any believable evidence.

The Court finds that the

defendant's move was certainly something that could and should have
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been reasonably foreseen at the time of the divorce, and also
anticipated as a possibility later on, inasmuch as this Court
during the pendency of the proceedings and before the move,
required an advance notice of relocation provision• The plaintiff
and the defendant both made appropriate job-related relocations,
and even though the defendant was not able to provide the requisite
advance notice of his move to Wisconsin, an appropriate pre-move
hearing was had and the intent of the notice was therefore met.
The Court finds that the defendant's relocation was not only
something foreseeable to the parties at the time of the divorce,
but likely anticipated at that time.
Neither party has any connection with the state of Utah, other
than jobs and the children. Plaintiff's extended family support is
outside the state of Utah in Missouri, where she is moving as soon
as she is able to accomplish the sale of her residence.

The

evidence in this case shows no improper motive on the part of the
defendant in relocating to the state of Wisconsin as a result of
his employment.
Plaintiff's

move-related

claim

that

the

relocation

has

negatively impacted the children, and that such impact constituted
a change of circumstances

is likewise not supported by the

believable evidence. The Court recognizes that any change,
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including relocation, has some effect, usually perceived by the
children to be negative, on children.

The evidence does show,

however, that the children are doing well in school in the state of
Wisconsin, and have adequately adjusted and become part of the
community at their new residence.

The Court also notes that the

evidence supports a finding and the Court does find that the
defendant took extraordinary steps as referred to in this record to
minimize the natural adverse effect of the move on the children by
seeking advice from professionals in the area who could instruct
the defendant on what steps to take with the children on that
issue.
Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in
the children's lives, is a positive factor.

Cynthia Michael is

able to assist her husband, the defendant;, to some degree in
meeting

the children's daily needs.

Cynthia Michael has not

attempted to act inappropriately towards the children, and evidence
suggesting to the contrary is not persuasive.

Defendant's present

wife has not attempted to replace the plaintiff as the children's
mother any more than the plaintiff's present husband has attempted
to take the place of the defendant as the children's father.

The

Court notes that Schuyler's testimony in chambers did not rise to
the level claimed as to the defendant's present wife, Cynthia
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Michael's, and on that issue, even to the extent negative, was
animated and used language uncharacteristic of a child of the age
and maturity of Schuyler.

The Court believes that Schuyler's

statements regarding his stepmother may have been implanted,
hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the plaintiff's interests
in mind.

The children, whether with the plaintiff

defendant, are

or the

in a better position, having contact with a

stepparent, especially an appropriate stepparent, than the children
would be in a daycare or spending time when not with the plaintiff
or the defendant, with a person who would constitute a "legal"
stranger.

To the extent that the defendant's remarriage has been

a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive change in the
defendant's household

and not a basis to find

a change of

circumstances for the purposes of considering a change of custody.
The

allegations

that

the

children

are

being

"abused"

(Schuyler's term), by their stepmother are not supported by the
believable

evidence.

There

is

no

sufficient

change

in

circumstances that would allow this Petition to proceed, based upon
the defendant's remarriage or the children's relationship with
their stepmother, Cynthia Michael.
The Court turns to the defendant's assertion of change of
circumstances due to visitation problems. A review of this record
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shows that it is replete with visitation disputes since the divorce
was entered in July of 1991. Accordingly, continued disputes are
not new, and do not constitute a change of circumstances as
unfortunate as they may be.
The evidence in this case shows that since the defendants
move to the state of Wisconsin, the visitation, considering its
frequency and the fact that the defendant bears the total financial
obligation therefore has gone reasonably smooth.

The evidence

shows that weather, and on one occasion finances, have impacted
visitation. The majority of the visitation problems revolve around
agreeing upon times for make-up visitation when the weather has
prohibited the children visiting their mother because problems with
airline schedules. Neither party has been particularly cooperative
regarding alternative visitation days. Inasmuch as the visitation
difficulties have not changed since the inception of the divorce
Decree, there is not a change of circumstances, and to the extent
that difficulties in rescheduling missed visitation under the
circumstances of the temporary Order, considering its frequency and
the distance between the children and their mother, there is no
evidence to support that difficulties in visitation constitute a
change of circumstances sufficient to allow this Court to revisit
the issue of custody. The difficulties are merely ongoing, and to
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a large degree a result of a monthly visitation schedule requiring
two small children to be shuttled

by air halfway across the

country, principally at defendant's expense.
Turning to the last major area that the plaintiff alleges
constitutes a change of circumstances, Schuyler's recently stated
preference to live with the plaintiff, and his stated reluctance to
be with his father, the defendant, the Court notes with some
interest as did Dr. Sanders (the Court's designated expert), that
both

children

had

continually

maintained

a

neutral

position

regarding their preference as to living location until Dr. Sanders'
last interview, which was the day before this hearing was scheduled
to commence, when Schuyler asserted that he wanted to live with his
mother and effectively didn't want anything to do with his father.
It was further reported by Dr. Sanders that Schuyler advised
her that his stepmother "abused" him.

Dr. Sanders was unable to

account for this sudden and drastic change from the "safe" and
neutral position adopted by Schuyler, except that she was of the
opinion that Schuyler's perception of life with his mother, the
plaintiff, and how that would be if he resided with her was based
upon fantasy and not reality.

She did not believe that the child

had been influenced by the plaintiff.

While Schuyler's announced

change from a position of refusing to state a preference to a
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strong preference towards residing with the plaintiff is certainly
a change, unless the change is based upon reality, it has no basis
and cannot be considered a change for purposes of determining
whether

or

not

circumstances.

there

has

been

a

significant

change

of

The following observations are relevant to the

present stated position of Schuyler.
Schuyler has been with his mother for the six week period of
time prior to the hearing.

Part of that time Schuyler has been

with his maternal grandparents at their farm in Missouri.

The

visitation periods at his grandparents in Missouri and with his
mother are clearly filled with fun activities and carefree times.
There are no schedules, no schoolwork, no lessons, or athletic
practice, household chores or the like.

£11 the activities are

geared towards having an enjoyable time, especially, things that
are enjoyable

for a child

the age of Schuyler.

He has the

opportunity to be involved with farm animals, he is allowed to
operate four-wheel off-road vehicles, participates in trips to
amusement parks such as Lagoon and Raging Waters. Those activities
are surely enjoyable for Schuyler, and he is lucky to have access
to those activities with his mother, but they are not what would
occur

on a long-term

basis when school, children's

responsibilities, and the like must be considered.

household

To the extent
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that Schuyler's stated preference is based upon his activities with
his

mother,

the

plaintiff,

and her

extended

family, those

activities are not the reality of what would occur on a day-in and
day-out basis if he was with his mother, the plaintiff, full-time.
The Court determines such to be the case, even in the face of
plaintiff's attempts to portray her lifestyle as being "laid back"
and involving a lot of fun activities. The Court does not believe
that the plaintiff's normal lifestyle is such that it includes
nonstop fun activities for children.
While the Court has no evidence that Schuyler has been
influenced by the plaintiff, some of his words and demeanor suggest
that his statements may not be his own. As indicated earlier, his
statements in chambers were not as strong as those made to Dr.
Sanders and related by her during her testimony during the course
of this trial.

Finally, the Court

is concerned

that the

plaintiff's extended family may be influencing Schuyler. The Court
notes that the plaintiff's mother, Arlene Wilcox, who testified as
a witness in this case, indicated among other things, that she had
a poor relationship with one of her other children, one of the
plaintiff's siblings, because she (Arlene Wilcox) had intervened in
a custody dispute between her son and his spouse.

The children

have spent considerable time with their maternal grandmother, and
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she, in view of her position, could certainly exercise considerable
influence over them if she chose to do so. As she indicated in the
circumstance with her own son, the children's grandmother, Ms.
Wilcox,

has

chosen

to

be

involved

in

some

of

her

other

grandchildren's custody issues.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court does not believe that
Schuyler's stated desire to reside with his mother constitutes a
significant or material, or valid change of circumstance. Further,
even if the stated change of preference by Schuyler constituted a
material change of circumstances, that change in and of itself is
insufficient to allow this Court to find a material change of
circumstances,
interests.

and

then

proceed

The appellate

on

to

the

courts of this

question
state have

of

best

clearly

announced that a child's stated change in preference, even when
based in reality, is not sufficient in and of itself to make a
change of circumstances to meet the requirements of the first phase
in a petition to modify custody.
The Court is therefore unable to find a legitimate change in
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce between the
parties, and is therefore compelled to dismiss the defendant's
Petition to change custody of the parties' minor children.
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The defendant has requested attorney fees as a result of
plaintiff's
attorney

Petition to Modify.

fees

request

and

The Court will consider the

therefore

directs

that

defendant's

counsel submit an appropriate Affidavit setting forth the fees
requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the factual and
legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs.

The

expenses related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed.

The

Affidavit and Memorandum should be filed within fifteen (15) days.
The plaintiff may respond in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Code
of Judicial Administration.

Defendant's counsel should prepare

appropriate Findings and an Order of Dismissal reserving costs and
fees.
Dated this

/^Aia^~4^f--Aucfustf 1994.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

DEC 1 4 1994

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
ROBIN L. CLINK, fka
ROBIN L. MICHAEL
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF MODIFICATION
OF DECREE AND DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION

vs.

Civil No. 915900171

RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

Judge:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Defendant.
—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on Plaintiffs
Amended Petition to Modify Custody on the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July,
1994, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person,
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was present in person
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court heard and considered the

testimony of each of the parties and the witnesses offered by each, the,testimony of the
custody evaluator appointed by the court, Dr. Jill Sanders, and received into evidence
various exhibits offered by the parties. At the conclusion of trial on the 18th day of July,

1994, the Defendant moved the court to dismiss the Petition of the Plaintiff as to a
change in custody based on there not being a material and substantial change of
circumstances. The court following the direction of the Utah Supreme Court in change
of custody matters, had limited evidence in the initial inquiry to a material and significant
change of circumstance. At the conclusion of hearing the evidence and the argument,
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition, the court took the Defendant's
Motion under advisement so as to evaluate the weight of the evidence relating to the
issue of change of circumstances since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in
Colorado on July 1, 1991, which Decree was entered after a two day trial on the issue
of custody.

The court also heard prior to and during the course of trial various

stipulations from counsel for their clients as to other issues presented in the Petition of
the Plaintiff and the request of the attorneys for an award of attorney's fees and costs
in this matter. The court set further hearings for the 1st and 2nd of August, 1994,
because travel arrangements had to be made in advance of that hearing on the second
phase of the custody petition. The court orally advised counsel on July 21, 1994 that
the court was satisfied that the evidence received during the course of the initial phase
of the proceedings did not rise to the level necessary to show a material and substantial
change of circumstances so as to allow the matter to proceed to consideration of the
best interest of the children and those proceedings were vacated. Thereafter, the court
on the 12th day of August, 1994, issued its written Memorandum Decision in this matter
and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
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1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties, their minor children and

subject matter of this action.
2.

The Petition of the Plaintiff to change physical custody from the

Defendant to herself is denied and dismissed with prejudice.
3. This court concludes it should accept the Stipulation of the parties as
to visitation and therefore modifies its prior orders in regard to visitation to award
visitation as follows:
a.

Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend nine continuous weeks with

their mother during the summer vacation from school.
b.

Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend a week at Thanksgiving

with the Plaintiff.

This week shall commence on the Monday before

Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving.
c.

Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend a one week period during

early spring with their mother which shall coincide with the spring vacation
from school.
d*

Ashleigh and Schuyler shall spend half their Christmas

vacation with each parent with Christmas Day in 1994 with their father and
Christmas Day in 1995 with their mother. They shall continue, thereafter,
spending one-half the Christmas vacation from school with each parent and
alternate Christmas Day each year.
4.

If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children

reside, she shall have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice,
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provided, however, that the visitation shall not interfere with their school or regularly
scheduled activities.
5.

The Plaintiff shall have direct access to all personnel involved with

her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by
this court, but, she shall be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and shall be allowed to attend
any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and extracurricular
activities. Defendant shall advise school, medical and occupational therapist personnel
to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff.
6.

The Plaintiff shall be notified immediately in the case of any medical

emergency and the Defendant shall be notified of any medical emergency during
visitation.
7.

Plaintiff shall have free telephone access to the children. During the

times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff, the Defendant shall have free
telephone access to the children.
8.

Plaintiff

shall

continue

Schuyler's

physical

exercises

and

physical/occupational therapy during visitation.
9.

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves and

takes under advisement the issue of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of the
visitation transportation costs for the minor children. Plaintiff is ordered to provide the
court and counsel for the Defendant information regarding her earnings when she
secures employment in Missouri and when her husband recovers from his surgery and
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is employed and to supply information concerning his earnings once he is employed.
The court will rule on this question when it has sufficient information to reach an
appropriate determination.
10.

Each of the parties shall exchange information about the children

and be flexible regarding visitation facilitate travel in the best interests of the children and
to permit the children to participate in special events in both the family of the Plaintiff and
the family of the Defendant.
11.

Defendant's counsel shall submit an appropriate Affidavit setting forth

the fees requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the factual and legal basis
that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. The expenses related to Dr. Sanders
shall also be addressed. The Affidavit and Memorandum should be filed within fifteen
(15) days. The Plaintiff may respond in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.
DATED this '/{f/

day of
dav

/(JLU&J^U^A1994.
AJlU&^u^\
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APPROVED AS TO FORM
A N D C O N T E N T THIS
DAY O F
, 1994:

SUZANNE MARELIUS, Counsel
for Plaintiff

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel
for Defendant

\
°^

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
hereby certify that I caused to be delivered this

entitled matter to:
Suzanne Marelius, Esq.
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Counsel for Plaintiff

(dsd\mb\Michael. Order)
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

DEC 1 h 1994

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
ROBIN L CLINK, fka
ROBIN L MICHAEL
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 915900171

RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

Judge:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Defendant.
—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on Plaintiffs
Amended Petition to Modify Custody on the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th of July,
1994, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person,
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant was present in person
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court heard and considered the

testimony of each of the parties and the witnesses offered by each, the testimony of the
custody evaluator appointed by the court, Dr. Jill Sanders, and received into evidence
various exhibits offered by the parties. At the conclusion of trial on the 18th day of July,

1994, the Defendant moved the court to dismiss the Petition of the Plaintiff as to a
change in custody based on there not being a material and substantial change of
circumstances. The court following the direction of the Utah Supreme Court in change
of custody matters, had limited evidence in the initial inquiry to a material and significant
change of circumstance. At the conclusion of hearing the evidence and the argument
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition, the court took the Defendant's
Motion under advisement so as to evaluate the weight of the evidence relating to the
issue of change of circumstances since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in
Colorado on July 1, 1991, which Decree was entered after a two day trial on the issue
of custody.

The court also heard prior to and during the course of trial various

stipulations from counsel for their clients as to other issues presented in the Petition of
the Plaintiff and the request of the attorney for an award of attorney's fees and costs in
this matter. The court set further hearings for the 1st and 2nd of August, 1994, because
travel arrangements had to be made in advance of that hearing on the second phase of
the custody petition. The court orally advised counsel on July 21, 1994 that the court
was satisfied that the evidence received during the course of the initial phase of the
proceedings did not rise to the level necessary to show a material and substantial
change of circumstances so as to allow the matter to proceed to consideration of the
best interest of the children and those proceedings were vacated. Thereafter, the court
on the 12th day of August, 1994, issued its written Memorandum Decision in this matter.
Being thus advised in the premises the court now makes and enters the following as its
FINDINGS OF FACT
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1.

The Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce

requesting a change in physical custody of the children from the Plaintiff to the
Defendant on or about October 8, 1992.
2.

At the time of the filing of the Petition to Modify the Decree of

Divorce, the Plaintiff and Defendant were both residents of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
3.

The parties were originally divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered

July 1, 1991 in Jefferson County, Colorado after a two-day trial, April 24th and April 25th,
1991, over the issue of custody of their minor children. After the trial, April 24 and April
25, 1991, the District Court for Jefferson County, State of Colorado, awarded joint legal
custody to the parties and placed physical custody of the children in the Defendant,
Rodney C. Michael. Prior to the entry of that Order, custody evaluations were performed
by Judith Jones Nugaris, MSW, filed in October of 1990 and by Dr. Mary Hansen, Ph.D.
filed on April 4, 1991.

At the time of the trial in Colorado, both the Plaintiff and

Defendant were residing outside of Colorado. The Defendant resided in the State of
Utah with the children and the Plaintiff resided in California. Each resided outside the
State of Colorado because of employment requirements.
4.

Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition on about the 10th day of August,

1991 seeking to domesticate that Decree as a Utah Decree and modify its provisions in
regard to visitation because Plaintiff had relocated from California to Utah. The matter
was resolved by stipulation approximately one year later.
5.

On September 29, 1992 an Order was entered effecting the
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agreement of the parties made on October 7, 1991 when the Defendant appeared before
the court, Commissioner Sandra Peuler presiding, and agreed to the visitation and child
support relief requested by the Plaintiff as well as domestication of the Colorado Decree
of Divorce as a Utah judgment.

6.

Following the entry of the Colorado Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff

moved from the State of California to the State of Utah. In August of 1991, when the
Plaintiff filed her Petition to Amend the Decree in regard to visitation both parties both
resided in Utah.
7.

The Colorado Decree awarded physical custody of the two minor

children, Schuyler born December 17, 1985, and Ashleigh, born July 10, 1987 to the
Defendant their father, Rodney Michael, and awarded substantial visitation rights to the
Plaintiff.

It awarded joint legal custody to Plaintiff and Defendant so that each party

would have access to important information relating to the children's education, medical
records and medical providers as well as other information of interest to the parties as
parents. As Schuyler suffers from cerebral palsy, it was and is important that both
parents be involved in providing the appropriate physical therapy for him when residing
with or visiting each parent.
8.

As the parties were divorced by a Colorado court on July 1, 1991,

after a two-day trial on the issue of custody and this proceeding followed, this court must
view this case as one where a custody determination made after a contested custody
trial is under challenge. This court is required by governing Utah law to look critically at
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the alleged change of circumstances as opposed to a more relaxed standard that might
be applicable where a custody was awarded based on default or stipulation. A contested
custody determination relating to custody, is entitled to greater deference than a custody
determination made upon default or stipulation.
9.

Plaintiff filed her second Petition in the Utah proceedings on October

8, 1992, approximately one month after the Order establishing visitation and child
support was entered in September of 1992. It alleged a modification in the Decree was
necessary because of the change of circumstances effected by the Defendant's
remarriage, which occurred on November 30, 1991 when the Defendant married Cynthia
Michael. The Petition was amended on December 31, 1992 to add additional grounds
for a change of circumstances and requesting that the Defendant not be permitted to
move from the State of Utah which he was doing because he had received a promotion
from his employer, Allan Bradley, which required relocation to Appleton, Wisconsin.
10.

The Motion requesting that the Defendant not be permitted to move

was denied. A visitation schedule was established and an Order appointing Dr. Jill
Sanders to do the custody evaluation was entered on the 7th day of April, 1993.
11.

The Defendant moved to Wisconsin as a result of his transfer and

promotion by his employer in January, 1993. The Plaintiff advised the court in her
testimony during July of 1994 that she is in the process of moving to her family home
in the State of Missouri regardless of the court's decision in this Petition and is in the
process of selling her Utah residence in anticipation of the move.
12.

The Plaintiff moved from Colorado to California prior to the original
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divorce of the parties as a result of her employment, a promotion. The Plaintiff remained
with the same employer when she moved to Utah in 1991, but this was not as a result
of a promotion. The Defendant moved from Colorado to Utah while the divorce was
pending in Colorado after Plaintiff had moved to California as a result of a promotion by
his employer. The Plaintiff testified that her move to Missouri would be for personal
reasons as she intended to terminate her employment and look for employment in
Missouri after she arrived. The extended family of the Plaintiff resides primarily in the
State of Missouri.
13.

The parties have, for all intents and purposes been involved in on-

going litigation regarding the Colorado Custody Order since it was entered.
14.

Since the entry of the Decree, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant

have remarried. The Plaintiff married Duane Clink on June 27, 1992. The Defendant
married Cynthia Michael on November 30, 1991.
15.

The five grounds on which the Plaintiff in her Amended Petition filed

December 31, 1992 asserted there had been a change of circumstances which required
that physical custody of the children be moved from the Defendant to herself, are as
follows:
a.

The Defendant remarried and the children, in particular the

older child, Schuyler, does not get along with his stepmother, Cynthia
Michael.
b.

Defendant's move to Wisconsin.

c.

Defendant's direct involvement with the children was reduced
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because now he has help with rearing the children from his current"spouse,
Cynthia Michael.
d.

The children, at least the older child, Schuyler, expressed a

strong desire to reside with the Plaintiff and manifested an unwillingness
to reside with the Defendant.
e.

The Defendant's alleged refusal to facilitate visitation since

his move to the State of Wisconsin and Plaintiff believed that the primary
caretaking duties had been shifted to her and Defendant travelled regularly
leaving the children with alternate caretakers.
16.

There is no change of circumstances regarding the residences and

moves of the parties since entry of the Colorado Decree on the alleged grounds that the
parties live in different states. Except for an eighteen month period of time in Utah, both
the Plaintiff and the Defendant have moved and lived in different states. Immediately
prior to the commencement of the Colorado divorce action, the Defendant resided in
Colorado and the Plaintiff in California. At the time of the divorce trial in Colorado, the
Plaintiff resided in California, and the Defendant resided in the State of Utah. The
Plaintiff later moved to the State of Utah and following that, in the early part of 1993, the
Defendant relocated to the State of Wisconsin. The Plaintiff related at trial she intends
to and is in the process of moving to Missouri. Dr. Sanders did not believe the moves
of the parties were a change in circumstances. She noted the parties had moved during
their marriage, during the pendency of this matter and expected to move in the future.
17.

All of the moves by both parties since the divorce, with the exception
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of Plaintiffs move to the State of Utah were work-related. At the time of the divorce, the
Judge in Colorado was aware that the parties lived in states other than the State of
Colorado, and accordingly would have been aware that at that time both parties had
relocated outside the State of Colorado for work-related reasons. There is nothing new
in Defendant's work-related location change from Utah to Wisconsin. Robert Becker,
formerly the Defendant's supervisor in Allen Bradley, testified that for one moving up the
corporate ladder (the Defendant is very talented and moving up the corporate ladder)
would expect to move every few years and such moves are a regular foreseeable
occurrence. Each of the moves, from Colorado to Utah and from Utah to Wisconsin has
been the result of a substantial promotion. The move of the Plaintiff from Colorado to
California was also a promotion from her employer and she made that move believing
that the Defendant would move to California with her. The Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendant's move to Wisconsin was to distance the children from her is not supported
by any believable evidence. The court finds that the Defendant's move was certainly
something that could and should have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the
divorce, and also anticipated as a possibility later on, inasmuch as this court during the
pendency of the proceedings and before the move, required an advance notice of
relocation provision.
18.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant both made appropriate job-related

relocations, and even though the Defendant was not able to provide the requisite
advance notice of his move to Wisconsin, an appropriate pre-move hearing was had and
the intent of the notice was therefore met.
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The court finds that the Defendant's

relocation was not only something foreseeable to the parties at the time of the divorce,
but likely anticipated at that time.
19.

Neither party has any connection with the State of Utah, other than

jobs and the children. Plaintiffs extended family support is outside the State of Utah in
Missouri, where she is moving as soon as she is able to accomplish the sale of her
residence. The evidence in this case shows no improper motive on the part of the
Defendant in relocating to the State of Wisconsin as a result of his employment.
20.

Plaintiffs move-related claim that the relocation has negatively

impacted the children, and that such impact constituted a change of circumstances is not
supported by believable evidence. The court recognizes that any change, including
relocation, has some effect, usually perceived by the children to be negative, on children.
The evidence does show, however, that the children are doing well in school in the State
of Wisconsin, have adequately adjusted and become part of the community at their new
residence, have formed friendships and are happy and well adjusted. The court also
notes that the evidence supports a finding and the court does find that the Defendant
took extraordinary steps (consulting with psychologists about how to ease the stress of
the move, and then taking the children to Appleton, Wisconsin, before the move to allow
them to see their new school, to meet their classmates and to see the community to
which they would move and help make choices about the house and living arrangements
in Appleton) to minimize the natural adverse effect of the move on the children by
seeking advice from professionals who could instruct the Defendant on what steps to
take with the children on that issue and then to follow that advice.
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21.

Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in the

children's lives, is a positive factor. Cynthia Michael is able to assist her husband, the
Defendant in meeting the children's daily needs. Cynthia Michael has not attempted to
act inappropriately towards the children and evidence suggesting to the contrary is not
persuasive. Defendant's present wife has not attempted to replace the Plaintiff as the
children's mother any more than the Plaintiffs present husband has attempted to take
the place of the Defendant as the children's father. The court notes that Schuyler's
testimony in chambers did not rise to the level claimed as to negative feelings about the
Defendant's present wife, Cynthia Michael and to the extent it was negative, Schuyler
was animated and used language uncharacteristic of a child of the age and maturity of
Schuyler. The court believes that Schuyler's statements regarding his stepmother may
have been implanted, hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the Plaintiffs interests in
mind. The children, whether with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, are in a better position,
having contact with a stepparent, especially an appropriate stepparent, than the children
would be in a daycare or spending time when not with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, with
a person who would constitute a "legal" stranger. To the extent that the Defendant's
remarriage has been a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive change in the
Defendant's household and not a basis to find a change of circumstances for the
purposes of considering a change of custody.
22.

The court finds Defendant was involved with caring for and sharing

family activities with his children before and after his remarriage both in Utah and in
Wisconsin. The court finds no change in this behavior by the Defendant or the children
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after his marriage to Cynthia Michael.
23.

Dr. Sanders recommended to the court that there not be a change

in the custody Order in her original report to the court. Despite the fact that Schuyler in
his interview just before trial with Dr. Sanders was very strong in stating that he desired
to live with his mother, she felt that no change in custody should occur. The original
findings and recommendations to the court by Dr. Sanders were very similar to that
presented to the Colorado court by Dr. Mary Hansen, who recommended that physical
custody of the children be placed with the Defendant, Rod Michael. Dr. Sanders noted
that her original recommendation had been based on the Defendant's more consistent
desire for custody, the children were adjusting and doing well in his care, and there was
no reason to disrupt a previously determined long-standing custodial arrangement. The
only change that Dr. Sanders found was Schuyler's preference in her last interview with
the children.

This preference was not as adamantly stated by Schuyler when he

appeared before the court to express his own desires to the court in chambers as Dr.
Sanders descnbed them in his statements to her. This expressed preference occurred
after spending 6 weeks with his mother, Robin Clink, the Plaintiff who did not permit
contact with Rod Michael, until after Schuyler had seen Dr. Sanders. There had been
no change in Ashleigh.

Dr. Sanders related to the court that she believed this

preference was not based on reality, it was based on fantasy which though based upon
a true attachment for his mother, was a fantasy about a better life with his mother
because he spends play times, that is unstructured time away from school with his
mother while he spends structured school and work time with his father. He has had
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continuing discussions with his mother about change of custody while the Defendant will
not discuss changing custody or custody issues with Schuyler. Schuyler sees life with
his mother as being life in Missouri where he has always gone to play and which he
views as a sanctuary with his grandparents that removes him from the dispute between
his parents over his custody and he would move from being the oldest child in a three
child family (Cynthia and Rod Michael have had a child born of their marriage, Jake, who
was born on March 31, 1993) to the younger of two children if he lived with his mother.
The court finds that the evidence supports the findings and recommendations of Dr.
Sanders and they are adopted as the findings of the court on these points.
24.

The allegations that he is being "abused" (Schuyler's term), by his

stepmother is not supported by the believable evidence.
25.

There is no sufficient change in circumstances that would allow this

Petition to proceed, based upon the Defendant's remarriage or the children's relationship
with their stepmother, Cynthia Michael. In fact, the evidence was and the court finds that
the children are happy, well adjusted and interact in a loving, happy relationship with
Defendant and Cynthia Michael and Defendant as he did before his marriage to Cynthia
Michael is very involved in caring for, interacting with, and raising his children.
26.

At the final pretrial of this matter, counsel for the Defendant pointed

out to the court and counsel for the Plaintiff that the children would have spent
approximately 6 weeks with the Plaintiff prior to trial and that it would be a good idea for
the children to again see Dr. Sanders, the court appointed psychologist, immediately
prior to trial to see if there had been any change in circumstance. To facilitate this
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evaluation, counsel for the Defendant requested that the children be returned to the
Defendant before that meeting took place.

The Plaintiff refused to do this.

She

permitted no contact between the Defendant and Schuyler or Ashleigh before they saw
Dr. Sanders, though counsel for the Defendant attempted to arrange for Schuyler and
Ashleigh to visit with the Defendant before and be taken to that interview by the
Defendant. (Exhibits 16-D and 20-D).
27.

The court advised counsel for the Plaintiff at the pretrial that if

counsel for the Defendant's request was not honored, the court would have to consider
the fact that Plaintiff would not agree to allow the children to see the Defendant before
seeing Dr. Sanders. Despite this statement, Plaintiff refused to permit the children to see
their father before seeing Dr. Sanders.
28. The court finds no change of circumstances due to visitation problems.
A review of this record shows that it is replete with visitation disputes since the divorce
was entered in July of 1991. Accordingly, continued disputes are not new, and do not
constitute a change of circumstances as unfortunate as they may be.
29.

The evidence in this case shows that since the Defendant's move

to the state of Wisconsin, the visitation, considering its frequency and the fact that the
Defendant bears the total financial obligation therefore* has gone reasonably smoothly.
The evidence shows that weather, and on one occasion finances, have impacted
visitation. The majority of the visitation problems revolve around agreeing upon times
for make-up visitation when the weather prohibited the children visiting their mother
because of problems with airline schedules.

13

Neither party has been particularly

cooperative regarding alternative visitation days. Inasmuch as the visitation difficulties
have not changed since the inception of the divorce Decree, there is not a change of
circumstances, and to the extent that difficulties in rescheduling missed visitation under
the circumstances of the temporary Order, considering its frequency and the distance
between the children and their mother, there is no evidence to support that difficulties
in visitation constitute a change of circumstances sufficient to allow this court to revisit
the issue of custody. The difficulties are merely ongoing, and to a large degree a result
of a monthly visitation schedule requiring two small children to be shuttled by air halfway
across the country, at Defendant's expense.
30.

The Plaintiff alleges a change of circumstances based on Schuyler's

recently stated preference to live with the Plaintiff, and his stated reluctance to be with
his father.

The court notes with some interest as did Dr. Sanders (the Court's

designated expert), that both children had continually maintained a neutral position
regarding their preference as to living location until Dr. Sanders' last interview, which
was the day before this hearing was scheduled to commence, when Schuyler asserted
that he wanted to live with his mother and effectively did not want anything to do with
his father. It was further reported by Dr. Sanders that Schuyler advised her that his
stepmother "abused" him. Dr. Sanders was unable to account for this sudden and
drastic change from the "safe" and neutral position adopted by Schuyler, except that she
was of the opinion that Schuyler's perception of life with his mother, the Plaintiff, and
how that would be if he resided with her was based upon fantasy and not reality. Dr.
Sanders did not believe that the child had been influenced by the Plaintiff.
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While

Schuyler's announced change from a position of refusing to state a preference to a
strong preference towards residing with the Plaintiff is certainly a change, unless the
change is based upon reality, it has no basis and cannot be considered a change for
purposes of determining whether or not there has been a significant change of
circumstances.
31.

The following observations are relevant to the present stated position

of Schuyler. Schuyler had been with his mother for the six week period of time prior to
the hearing. Part of that time Schuyler has been with his maternal grandparents at their
farm in Missouri. The visitation periods at his grandparents in Missouri and with his
mother are clearly filled with fun activities and carefree times. There are no schedules,
no schoolwork, no lessons or athletic practice, no household chores or the like. All the
activities are geared towards having an enjoyable time, especially, things that are
enjoyable for a child the age of Schuyler. He has the opportunity to be involved with
farm animals, he is allowed to operate four-wheel off-road vehicles, participates in trips
to amusement parks. Those activities are surely enjoyable for Schuyler, and he is lucky
to have access to those activities with his mother, but they are not what would occur on
a long-term basis when school, children's household responsibilities, and the like must
be considered. To the extent that Schuyler's stated preference is based upon his
activities with his mother, the Plaintiff, and her extended family, those activities are not
the reality of what would occur on a day-in and day-out basis if he was with his mother,
the Plaintiff, full-time. The court determines such to be the case, even in the face of
Plaintiffs attempts to portray her lifestyle as being "laid back" and involving a lot of fun
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activities. The court does not believe that the Plaintiffs normal lifestyle is such that it
includes nonstop fun activities for children. While the court has no evidence that
Schuyler has been influenced by the Plaintiff, some of his words and demeanor suggest
that his statements may not be his own.

As indicated earlier, his statements in

chambers were not as strong as those made to Dr. Sanders and related by her during
her testimony during the course of this trial. Finally, the court is concerned that the
Plaintiffs extended family may be influencing Schuyler.

The court notes that the

Plaintiffs mother, Arlene Wilcox, who testified as a witness in this case, indicated among
other things, that she had a poor relationship with one of her other children, one of the
Plaintiffs siblings, because she (Arlene Wilcox) had intervened in a custody dispute
between her son and his spouse. The children have spent considerable time with their
maternal grandmother, and she, in view of her position, could certainly exercise
considerable influence over them if she chose to do so. As she indicated in the
circumstance with her own son, the children's grandmother, Ms. Wilcox, has chosen to
be involved in some of her other grandchildren's custody issues.
For all the foregoing reasons, the court does not believe that Schuyler's
stated desire to reside with his mother constitutes a significant or materials, or valid
change of circumstance. Further, even if the stated change of preference by Schuyler
constituted a material change of circumstances, that change in and of itself is insufficient
to allow this court to find a material change of circumstances, on which to proceed on
to the question of best interests.

The appellate courts of this state have clearly

announced that a child's stated change in preference, even when based in reality, is not
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sufficient in and of itself to make a change of circumstances to meet the requirements
of the first phase in a petition to modify custody.
32.

The court is unable to find a legitimate change in circumstances

since the entry of the Decree of Divorce between the parties, and is therefore compelled
to dismiss the Defendant's Petition to change custody of the parties' minor children.
33.

The court finds that the minor children have resided with Defendant

throughout their lives. They remained with him when Plaintiff, prior to the filing of the
divorce action, moved to California to pursue her employment. The Defendant has
provided a stable home and environment for the children and the children have thrived
in the environment provided for them by the Defendant. The children have not resided
with the Plaintiff, except for visitation, since she left the marital home in Colorado to
accept a job promotion in California.
34.

Dr. Sanders recommended and the parties stipulated that visitation

should be as follows:
a.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend nine continuous weeks

with their mother during the summer vacation from school.
b.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a week at Thanksgiving

with the Plaintiff. This week should commence on the Monday before
Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving.
c.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a one week period

during early spring with their mother to coincide with the spring vacation
from school.
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d.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend half their Christmas

vacation with each parent. In 1994 the children should spend Christmas
Day with their father and in 1995 spend Christmas Day with their mother.
They should continue, thereafter, spending one-half the Christmas vacation
from school with each parent and alternate Christmas day each year.
35.

If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children

reside, she should have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice,
provided, however, that the visitation should not interfere with their school or regularly
scheduled activities.
36.

The Plaintiff should have direct access to all personnel involved with

her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by
this court, but, she should be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and, she should be allowed to
attend any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and
extracurricular activities. Defendant should advise school, medical and occupational
therapist personnel to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff.
37.

The Plaintiff should be notified immediately in the case of any

medical emergency as should the Defendant should the medical emergency occur during
visitation.
38.

Defendant should have free telephone access to the children during

the times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff should have free
telephone access to the children while they reside with Defendant.
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39.

Plaintiff should be required to continue Schuyler's physical exercises

and physical/occupational therapy during visitation.
40.

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves the

issue of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of visitation transportation costs for
the minor children. The Plaintiff should be ordered to provide the court and counsel for
the Defendant information regarding her earnings when she secures employment in
Missouri and when her husband recovers from his surgery and is employed she should
provide information about his earnings.
41.

The court finds that the Defendant is not in contempt of the Orders

of this court. The difficulties in regard to visitation were either caused by financial
inability to comply with the Order of the court or problems that occurred through no fault
of the Defendant in regard to weather and transportation problems.
42.

Each of the parties should exchange information about the children

and be flexible regarding visitation to facilitate travel and visitation in the best interests
of the children and to permit the children to participate in special events in both the
family of the Plaintiff and the family of the Defendant.
43.

Each of the parties had requested that they be awarded their

attorney's fees. As the court has determined that the Petition of the Plaintiff should be
denied, her request should not be granted. The court will consider the Defendant's
attorney's fees request and therefore directs that Defendant's counsel submit an
appropriate affidavit setting forth the fees requested and a supporting memorandum
outlining the factual and legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs.
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The expenses related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, the

parties and their minor children.
2.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah and the Utah Court of

Appeals have articulated the standards for evaluating a Petition for Change of Custody.
The present law is based on the decision first articulated in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d,
51 (Utah 1982) where the court articulated that prior to a change of custody, the
Petitioner must show:
"...a court would not reopen the custody question until it had
first made a threshold finding of a substantially changed
circumstances. This would protect the custodial parent from
harassment by repeated litigation and protect the child from
"ping-pong" custody awards."

"Accordingly, we hold that in the future, a trial court's
decision to modify a Decree by transferring custody of a
minor child must involve two separate steps. In the initial
step, the court will receive evidence only as to the nature and
materiality of any changes in those circumstances upon
which the earlier award of custody was based. In this step,
the parties seeking modification must demonstrate (1) that
since the time of the previous Decree, there have been
changes in the circumstances upon which the previous award
was based; and (2) that those changes are sufficiently
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of
custody. The trial court must make a separate finding as to
whether this burden of proof has been met. If so, the court,
either as a continuation of the same hearing, or in a separate
hearing, will proceed to the second step. However, where
that burden of proof is not met, the trial court will not reach
the second step, the Petition to Modify will be denied, and
the custody award will remain unchanged.
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In the second step, having found that a substantial and
material change in the circumstances justifies a
reconsideration of the custodial award, the trial court must
consider the changes in circumstances along with all other
evidence relevant to the welfare or best interest of the child,
including the advantage of stability in custodial arrangements
that will always weigh against changes in the party awarded
custody."
649 P.2d at 53-54.
This test was further refined in Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984)
and Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987) to require that the alleged change
must occur in the custodial home. Then in 1989 the Utah Court of Appeals ruled:
"Our reading of Hoqqe and its progeny suggest that on a
petition for custody modification, trial courts should carefully
scrutinize the facts behind the original award of custody. If
the initial award was based on a thorough examination by the
trial court of the various factors pertaining to the child's
welfare, a rigid application of the change-in-circumstance[s]
is in order. In such a case, the court has already considered
the best interests of the child and made a determination
consistent with that finding. Any subsequent petition for
modification of custody must overcome a high threshold in
order to 'protect the child from 'ping-pong' custody awards'
and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's
proper development."
Mauqhn v. Mauqhn, 770 P.2d 156, at 160.
3.

This court has concluded that there is no change in circumstances

beyond that of Schuyler's stated preference which the court has determined is not based
on reality but is fantasy encouraged by some other party. This court was advised by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah App. 1991)
that it should take great care in making a change of custody based on the sole factor of
a 12 year old child's expressed desires. In this case, Schuyler is 8 years of age and
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articulating a request which is based on fantasy, not reality.
4.

The court concludes that there has been no substantial or material

change change in circumstances which would justify a modification of the custody award
made by the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado after a contested trial on the
issue of custody, April 24, 25, 1991, effected by Decree entered July 1, 1991.
5. This court concludes it should accept the Stipulation of the parties as
to visitation and therefore modify its prior orders in regard to visitation to award visitation
as follows:
a.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend nine continuous weeks

with their mother during the summer vacation from school.
b.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a week at Thanksgiving

with the Plaintiff. This week should commence on the Monday before
Thanksgiving and end the Sunday after Thanksgiving.
c.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend a one week period

during early spring with their mother which should coincide with the spring
vacation from school.
d.

Ashleigh and Schuyler should spend half their Christmas

vacation with each parent with Christmas Day in 1994 should be spent with
their father and Christmas Day in 1995 should be spent with their mother.
They should continue, thereafter, spending one-half the Christmas vacation
from school with each parent and alternate Christmas Day each year.
6.

If the Plaintiff is going to be in Wisconsin or where the children
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reside, she should have the right to visit with the children on two weeks advance notice,
provided, however, that the visitation should not interfere with their school or regularly
scheduled activities.
7.

The Plaintiff should have direct access to all personnel involved with

her children's academic, medical and extracurricular activities as previously ordered by
this court, but, she should be responsible for regularly contacting those persons in order
to maintain an understanding of her children's activities and, she should be allowed to
attend any or all of the children's school conferences, school activities, and
extracurricular activities. Defendant should advise school, medical and occupational
therapists to send copies of any reports sent to him to Plaintiff.
8.

The Plaintiff should be notified immediately in the case of any

medical emergency as should the Defendant should the emergency occur during
visitation.
9.

Defendant should have free telephone access to the children during

the times that the children are visiting with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff should have free
telephone access to the children while they reside with Defendant.
10.

Plaintiff should be required to continue Schuyler's physical exercises

and physical/occupational therapy during visitation.
11.

Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, the court reserves the issue

of Defendant's request that Plaintiff pay part of visitation transportation costs for the
minor children and the Plaintiff is ordered to provide the court and counsel for the
Defendant information regarding her earnings when she secures employment in Missouri
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and when her husband recovers from his surgery and is employed and information about
his earnings once he is employed.
12.

Each of the parties should exchange information about the children

and be flexible regarding visitation to facilitate travel in the best interests of the children
and to permit the children to participate in special events in both the family of the Plaintiff
and the family of the Defendant.
13.

The court concludes that it will consider the attorney's fees request

of the Defendant and therefore directs that Defendant's counsel submit an appropriate
Affidavit setting forth the fees requested and a supporting Memorandum outlining the
factual and legal basis that should impact an award of fees and/or costs. The expenses
related to Dr. Sanders should also be addressed. The Affidavit and Memorandum
should be filed within fifteen (15) days. The Plaintiff may respond in accordance with
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
DATED this / * / day of

/fats*/*

1MOTHY R. HANSONf
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
THIS
day of
, 1994.

Suzanne Marelius
Counsel for Plaintiff

David S. Dolowitz
Counsel for Defendant
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Conclusions of Law in the above-entitled matter to:
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426 South 500 East
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